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Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of
Skepticism and Relativism
By W. BRDL' WENDEL*
As ANY TEACHER of applied ethics knows, the project of teaching
values in professional school encounters predictable resistance from
students. At some point in most professional ethics courses, some stu-
dent adopts a cynical stance and demands that the teacher defend the
entire enterprise of moral reasoning against the challenges of skepti-
cism, subjectivism, or relativism. In response to an ethical argument-
say, that a corporation should not profit from exploitive working con-
ditions in developing countries, or that a lawyer should not knowingly
tell a lie-we have all heard statements like these:
"That's just your ethical belief."
"It's not illegal, so what's wrong with it?"
"Maybe I wouldn't do that, but if it's not wrong for them, who am I
to say that it's wrong?"
"All ethics is just subjective [or a matter of opinion, or a mask for
the will to power, or the interests of the strongest, or not some-
thing about which we can have knowledge], so why are we talking
about it?"
"You shouldn't impose your views on others."
These queries vary considerably in their philosophical sophistica-
tion, but all reveal a deep discomfort with the language of values and
assertions of truth or objectivity in ethical discourse.
More practically, in the law school classroom, questions like these
threaten the ability of a teacher to make progress discussing "ethics
beyond the rules," that is, a critical moral framework from which not
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only individual actions but a regime of legal rules may be evaluated.1
Without such a framework, a law teacher is limited to teaching doc-
trine. Doctrine is not a bad thing; it is certainly important for students
in professional responsibility courses to be able to analyze a complex
client fraud or conflict of interest problem. Teaching legal doctrine,
however, is not the same thing as teaching legal ethics. The source of
ethics is not positive law, although there may of course be moral rea-
sons for obeying enacted law. Ethics has its source in something else,
which is precisely the focus of student skepticism. 2
I would like to do several things in this essay. First, I am interested
in the sources of students' wariness about moral reasoning and claims
about objectivity and truth in ethics. Sometimes I feel like a teacher of
geography who must confront a deeply entrenched belief that the
earth is flat. The earth is not flat, nor is ethics just a matter of opinion,
but one wonders why students persist in thinking the opposite. Teach-
ing effectively requires an understanding of where students are com-
ing from. Accordingly, the opening section of this essay is structured
around a series of hypotheses to explain the origins of student dis-
quiet with moral reasoning in professional education. Following this
initial inquiry, I would like to review briefly the scholarship on skepti-
cism and relativism, to see how ethical theorists respond to this chal-
lenge. The size of this literature is staggering, 3 and my interest here is
1. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J.
LEG. EDUC. 31, 48-50 (1992).
2. A brief definitional note: I do not distinguish between ethics and morality-the
terms are intended to be completely interchangeable throughout this essay. Some philoso-
phers do observe a distinction between these terms. Bernard Williams, for example, re-
gards morality as a subset of ethics, with the latter term being equivalent to the subject
dedicated to answering the question, "How should one live?" See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETH-
ICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 5-7 (1985). Morality, for Williams, is peculiarly con-
cerned with rights and duties, and is stringently universal and impartial. See id. at 60-64.
The domain of morality is an extremely interesting issue, and some linguistic distinction is
needed to capture the difference between questions about how in general one ought to
live one's life (who to marry, what career to choose, where to live, and so on) and what
special obligations apply in virtue of one's status as a moral agent. However, I will not use
the terms ethics and morality to capture this distinction here.
3. For some representative sources see, for example, OBJECrIVITY IN LAW AND MORALs
(Brian Leiter ed., 2000); HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 27-61 (1999); SIMON BLACKBURN,
RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING 279-310 (1998) [hereinafter BLACK-
BURN, RP]; GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL
OBJECrIvrrv (1996); ROM HARR# & MICHAEL KRAUSZ, Moral Relativism, in VARIETIES OF RELA-
TIVISM 149 (1996); MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY: A TRIBUTE TOJOHN MACKIE (Ted Honderich
ed., 1985); RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVISM, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH (1991); RELATIVISM: IN-
TERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION (Michael Krausz ed., 1989); DAVID B. WONG, MORAL
RELATVITY (1984); RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENETICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); BERNARD WILLIAMS, The Truth in Relativism, in MORAL
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not to respond to any particular metaethical argument. Thus, the por-
tion of the essay that discusses ethical theory will be nothing more
than a suggestive and brief sketch of an account of ethical reasoning
that avoids the pitfall of relativism. Despite glances at metaethical is-
sues and an occasional detour into technical matters, I believe that
when teaching practical ethics, such as a law school professional re-
sponsibility course, one can safely avoid many of the questions that
preoccupy moral philosophers. One needs to be a specialist in con-
temporary ethics to make sense of the debate over internalism and
externalism, or to keep straight the varieties of noncognitivism, but
this is not required to teach an applied ethics course. This is not to say
that anyone may dabble in professional ethics without investing time
and careful study in the subject. It would be a mistake, however, to
confine a course on legal ethics to doctrine out of fear that the discus-
sion would lead inevitably to matters that are beyond the expertise of
anyone but a narrowly focused expert in philosophy. One of the goals
of this essay is therefore to suggest some strategies for responding to
some commonly expressed concerns of students about ethics, while
steering clear of technical quagmires.
Briefly summarizing this approach, I believe that ordinary discur-
sive practices, with which students are familiar, contain abundant re-
sources for thinking about ethical issues and reaching judgments that
we are willing to assert publicly and defend rationally. Every day stu-
dents engage in practices of evaluation, assigning blame and praise for
moral reasons. For some reason they do not generally recognize that
they are working within the domain of "ethics," but that is precisely
what they are doing. We can make progress teaching ethics by begin-
ning with the foundation of everyday experience.4 Starting from the
bottom up we can do two important things: First, we can reason by
LUCK 132 (1981); Russ Shafer-Landau, Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism, and Moral
Indeterminacy, 54 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 331 (1994); David B. Wong, Coping with
Moral Conflict and Ambiguity, 102 ETHICS 763 (1992);Judith Wagner DeCew, Moral Conflicts
and Ethical Relativism, 101 ETHICS 27 (1990); David Copp, Harman on Internalism, Relativism,
and Logical Form, 92 ETHICS 227 (1982); George Sher, Moral Relativism Defended?, 89 MIND
589 (1980); David Lyons, Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence, 86 ETHICS 107
(1976); Geoffrey Harrison, Relativism and Tolerance, 86 ETHICS 122 (1976); Robert Coburn,
Relativism and the Basis of Morality, 85 PHIL. REV. 87 (1976); Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativ-
ism Defended, 85 PHIL. REV. 3 (1975); Clyde Kluckhorn, Ethical Relativity: Sic et Non, 52 J.
PHIL. 663 (1955); Richard B. Brandt, The Significance of Differences of Ethical Opinion for Ethi-
cal Rationalism, 4 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL Rs. 469 (1944).
4. See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 179 (ames Conant ed.,
1990) [hereinafter PUTNAM, RHF]; see also Stuart Hampshire, Fallacies in Moral Philosophy, in
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 51, 55 (Alasdir MacIntyre & Stanley Haurwas eds., 1983).
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analogy to relevantly similar cases in professional life. If we think it
would be wrong to keep a secret when revealing the secret would
avoid harm to another person, we can ask whether a lawyer is justified
in keeping a client's secret under similar circumstances. Second, we
can reason upward from particular cases in the direction of more ab-
stract ethical principles. The process of reasoning by analogy and de-
riving higher order evaluative principles cannot proceed without
standards for judging ethical arguments as better or worse. It is our
tacit agreement on those standards that enables ethical discourse to
occur, even though we may not recognize the pervasiveness of these
criteria of judgment.
To take a mundane example, suppose we agree that it is wrong to
cut in a line of students that has formed to get into a Duke basketball
game at Cameron Indoor Stadium. This is a moral evaluation-a stu-
dent would use value-laden language (e.g. "that person is ajerk!") to
describe someone who jumped the queue and got into the basketball
game, while others farther back in line were excluded. We can then
ask in virtue of what it is wrong. The answer will tell us something about
the nature of moral principles. In the example of the queue, the
wrongness of cutting ahead of others is related to the function of the
line as a solution to a coordination problem. Everyone wants to get
into the basketball game, but not everyone can fit, and certainly not
everyone can get through the doors at the same time. Thus, in order
to secure a collective good (the game, and safe access to the stadium),
it is necessary for everyone to submit to a fair procedure by which
their interests and the interests of others are treated impartially. This
is a trivial example, but it nevertheless reveals something about the
function and nature of ethical reasoning. It shows that the standards
of acceptability of ethical judgments include virtues such as impartial-
ity, generalizability, and avoidance of human suffering. It further
shows that particular kinds of human goods, desires, activities, and
interests can serve as part of the foundation for ethical evaluation.
The standards for evaluating ethical arguments, which emerge from
the discussion of everyday controversies, are objective in the sense that
they are definite, knowable, and shared among participants in ethical
disputes. And as Hilary Putnam, from whom much of this method of
analysis is drawn, has said, "that is objectivity enough."5
5. PUTNAM, RHF, supra note 4, at 178.
[Vol. 36
TEACHING VALUES SYMPOSIUM
This analysis does not avoid metaethics altogether.6 The answer
to the queue jumping question does not make reference to God's will,
or moral facts, or the dictates of pure reason. We may want to revise
our answer after deeper reflection on the structure of morality. No-
tice, however, that the justification for our response ("that person is a
jerk!") to the situation does exclude some varieties of relativism and
skepticism. It is inconsistent to say that ethics is just the interests of the
stronger and to maintain simultaneously that the line cutter is a jerk,
for if he gets away with cutting in line, he is by definition stronger
than those patient souls who stood in line and failed to get into the
stadium. It is also inconsistent to criticize the cheater and to hold that
ethics is relative to individual belief systems (as students sometimes
carelessly do when they say that something is "wrong for me," but not
for the person in the case under discussion). Ethics must have some
interpersonal bite if we are to make sense of everyday evaluative terms
like "cheater," "jerk," "sleazeball," and the like. The reaction of our
hypothetical observers also undercuts the claim that we should not
impose values on others, for surely the observers would have no quar-
rel if security guards ejected the cheating student from the game. Fi-
nally, the response is inconsistent with skepticism about first order
ethical truths, because the speaker has not withheld her criticism on
the grounds that ethical truths are unknowable, although it may be
compatible with second order doubts about the objectivity of her
value judgment.7
That is what I mean by everyday discursive practices-the process,
in which people engage in their daily lives, of making judgments
about their own behavior and the actions of others, based on moral
reasons. My claim in this essay is that there are enough resources to
get the students beyond their reflexively relativist or skeptical reac-
tions to the language of morals. Ethics is presupposed by our interac-
tions with others. By reasoning analogically from our evaluative
response to particular cases, we can construct a moral framework from
the bottom up, without getting bogged down in highly abstract ques-
tions of ethical theory that are both difficult for the non-specialist
teacher to tackle and daunting for students without the appropriate
6. Metaethics is the investigation of the nature of moral judgments, including ques-
tions about how moral claims are justified, and whether they are objective or subjective. It
is to be contrasted with normative ethics, which is concerned with questions of what actions
are right or wrong. See Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de si~cle Ethics: Some Trends, 101
PHIL. REV. 115, 125-26 (1992).
7. For the terminology of first and second order skepticism about ethics, see J.L.
MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 15-17 (1977).
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background.8 The reactions to particular cases are there--I doubt very
much that students get by without responding to the actions of others
using evaluative terms such as right and wrong, good and bad, loyal
and disloyal, kind and cruel, generous and stingy, trustworthy and un-
trustworthy, "a stand-up guy" and "an asshole," and so on. And they
probably do not act like people living in a Hobbesian condition of the
war of all against all, resorting to violence to settle even inconsequen-
tial disputes and refusing to respond to reasonable efforts at persua-
sion. People do ethics without much trepidation, it is only talking about
ethics that seems to frighten students. 9
Although the definition of moral relativism will emerge over the
course of this essay, through the discussion of similar concepts, it is
important to begin with a provisional definition. In general, moral
relativism is the claim that "practices and actions are never just or un-
just absolutely and without further qualification. They are just or un-
just ... only conditionally, given the norms of justice in a particular
society, and only in relation to those norms." 10 The clause following
the word "given" is important here, because moral relativism differs
according to what ethical claims are supposed to be relative to-the
conventions of a society, 1 a culture, 12 a tradition, 13 or a "form of life"
8. See Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rue, Story, and Commitment in the Teach-
ing of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 162-63 (1996) (recommending that legal
ethics be studied and taught in context, not in abstract terms, even though it might entail a
sacrifice of some of the prestige of highly theoretical disciplines such as law and econom-
ics). For discussion of case by case reasoning in moral philosophy see HuGo ADAM BEDAU,
MAKING MORTAL CHOICES: THREE EXERCISES IN MORAL CASUISTRY (1997); ALBERT R.JONSEN
& STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY. A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988).
There is also a resemblance here to the Rawlsian idea of reflective equilibrium. SeeJOHN
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971).
9. I have always treasured this line from Nozick: "When in the Republic Thrasymachus
says that justice is the interests of the stronger, and Socrates starts to question him about
this, Thrasymachus should hit Socrates over the head." ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 434 (1981) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS]. Our students be-
have exactly like Thrasymachus-they vociferously express doubt about whether moral
principles are intersubjectively valid, but also engage in reasoned arguments about ethi-
cally charged matters, the hot button issues on campus such as affirmative action, sweat-
shop labor, globalization, and so on. Their participation in these arguments refutes their
earlier contention that ethics is just the interests of the strong, or is purely relative to
cultural groups.
10. STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 62-63 (1989) (like most moral
philosophers, arguing against relativism). For a more technical definition, see ROBERT
NOZICK, INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE WORLD 19 (2001) [hereinafter
NOZICK, INVARIANCES].
11. "If the moral principles recognized in the society of which X is a member imply
that it is wrong to do A in certain circumstances C, then it is wrong for X to do A in C."
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in Wittgensteinian parlance. 14 (In the classroom, the relevant group is
usually suggested as one that is small enough to relieve the student of
having to make a moral judgment.) Some relativists assert that ethical
claims are entirely subjective, that is, relative to belief systems of indi-
viduals, rather than to the conventions and practices of societies or
other large groups. 15 Another version of this claim is familiar as the
argument of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic Justice is nothing more
than the label that the strong give to their interests. 16 This argument
was famously inverted by Nietzsche, who thought that the language of
ethics was used by the weak to lord it over the strong, who are in the
thrall of false beliefs about the nature of morals.
An anti-relativist stance will accordingly be one that does not ter-
minate the chain of justification with a statement about how things
are done in the agent's culture, tribe, or society. Non-relative ethical
reasons must in some sense be cross-culturally valid, but it is important
not to set this bar too high. I think a good deal of the seductive quality
of moral relativism is due to the tendency of students to assume that
the only beliefs that count as "knowledge" are those that can be veri-
fied through the methods of the empirical sciences. We know the
moon is not made of cheese because we have brought back moon
rocks and subjected them to physical and chemical analysis. Because
we cannot verify that genocide is evil by performing similar tests, it is
tempting to conclude that we do not know that genocide is evil. This is
the wrong conclusion to draw from the difference between justifica-
tion in natural science and in ethics. I, for one, am just as confident
that genocide is evil as I am that the moon is not made of cheese; the
challenge for teachers of ethics, though, is to suggest to students how
one might undertake to justify that claim.
There are several promising alternatives. One is to establish a
common point of view (generally hypothetical, with constraints on the
participants to ensure that they behave "reasonably") from which we
can evaluate moral claims for their acceptability to all affected per-
Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Relativism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 75, 76 (Paul Ed-
wards ed., 1967).
12. See Melville J. Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism
(Frances Herskovits ed., 1972); EDWARD WESTERMARCK, ETHICAL RELATIVITY (1932).
13. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988); Julia Annas,
Maclntyre on Traditions, 188 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 388 (1989).
14. See Cyril Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief 111-44 (1991).
15. For a definition of "relativism," see THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
790 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999) (distinguishing conventionalism and subjectivism).
16. See PLATO, Republic, Book I, at 338c-339b (Paul Shorey trans.), in THE COLLECTED
DIALOGUES (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
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sons. 17 The interaction may also be modeled on individual interac-
tions, rather than society-wide rules ofjustice. For example, we might
ask whether a given principle can be defended on grounds that no
one may reasonably reject. 18 Alternatively, we could take an approach
inspired by Kant and attempt to locate the objectivity in ethics in the
structure of reason, as Christine Korsgaard attempted to do by eluci-
dating the human characteristic of reflective self-consciousness. 19 We
could also understand reasoning a bit less ambitiously than Kant, and
seek only to identify standards for the rational acceptability of ethical
arguments. 20 We might even posit that these criteria which identify
ethical arguments as better or worse are dependent upon common
human experiences, sentiments, concerns, interests, and capacities-
immediate emotional and physical sensations such as pain, grief, loss,
suffering, longing, pleasure, anger,jealousy, love, and alienation; facts
about how we confront the world, such as our need for food and shel-
ter; inclinations such as the desire for respect, esteem, and glory, and
the opposed need for peace and security; our sociable and disputa-
tious natures; our capacities to lead more or less fulfilling lives; and so
on. None of these approaches makes reference to mysterious non-nat-
ural moral properties that directly underwrite normative evaluations,
yet they provide a foundation for ethics that extends the reach of ethi-
cal judgments beyond one's own culture.
This is the sort of response that strikes me as the right approach
to ethics, although it may have insufficient substantive content to sat-
isfy those who would like the content of morality to be more determi-
nate at the first order of evaluation. The principal claim of this paper
is that teachers and students should not expect ethics to be primarily
about substantive truths that are underwritten by rationality. Rather,
the objectivity of ethics consists in its being a particular kind of ration-
ality, which uses certain reasoning procedures to frame disagreements
about moral issues. This is not intended to be a radical position;
rather, it closely parallels some fairly mainstream philosophy. It is in-
spired in part by the epistemological position that truth (in regard to
empirical questions) is largely a matter of having one's procedures of
verification right. In other words, the predicate "true" in the sentence
"it is true that the sun is 93 million miles from the earth" expresses the
speaker's endorsement of a set of investigative and justificatory tech-
17. See, e.g.,John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77J. PHIL. 519 (1980).
18. See Thomas M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, passim (1998).
19. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NoP, mATIvrrv, passim (1996).
20. See PUTNAM, RHF, supra note 4, at 135-92.
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niques which have won acceptance in a community of scientific in-
quirers, and which support the proposition that the sun is ninety-
three million miles from the earth. Just as science delivers objective
truths by employing methods of investigation, verification, and justifi-
cation, the objectivity of ethics is located in its use of particular meth-
ods of reasoning, making reference to facts and reasons that are
relevant in the domain of ethics. In other words, instead of getting
excited about words like "truth" and "objectivity," we can make pro-
gress by examining more carefully the processes by which claims to
truth are supported by reasoning.
Before developing these arguments in more detail, it may be in-
teresting to inquire into why our students are so quick to assert skepti-
cal or relativistic arguments. That is the task of the first Part.
I. Sources of the Climate of Relativism
The arguments in this Part are a kind of speculative, armchair
sociology, based on observing undergraduate and law students in pro-
fessional ethics courses, and talking with them outside of class. The
goal here is not to convince readers that there is one correct explana-
tion for student resistance to talking about ethics. Rather, I would like
to offer a series of hypotheses and see whether they resonate with the
experience of other ethics teachers. In my experience, student reac-
tion to ethics is highly variable. Some students regard the whole enter-
prise as a sham, perhaps identifying themselves with self-styled
debunkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Richard Rorty, Michel Fou-
cault, or Stanley Fish; other students may be deeply religious and re-
sent the secular approach taken by some ethics teachers; some may
have an ideological quarrel with their professor, and object only to the
slant of the discussion, not the use of value laden language; and per-
haps the majority is simply unacquainted with this way of thinking and
may be put off by the jargon. Naturally there may be students who are
comfortable with the language and methods of ethics and are not put
off at all by classroom discussions of normative issues. 21 As for the
skeptics and relativists, however, I think their attitude may be ex-
21. It is probably too early to assess the impact of the September 1 th terrorist attacks
on the classroom climate surrounding discussions of ethics. Several people who attended
the AALS panel presentation on teaching ethics in law school suggested that student skep-
ticism toward ethics may have diminished somewhat in the wake of an act of undeniable
evil. If this is true, I am hopeful that this newly found openness to ethics does not dissipate,
like the fear of flying that also increased last fall. Some have suggested that the Enron
debacle may similarly embolden students to speak up and identify a business practice or
action by a professional as wrong. Again, I think it is too early to tell, but what has been
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plained by one or more currents in the wider intellectual culture: the
occasional association in popular attitudes between non-relative ethi-
cal arguments and the political Right; the multiculturalism move-
ment; the decidedly chilly reception given to American assertions of
universal rights in international law, and the broader attack on tradi-
tional sources of authority and certainty carried out by critics who
brand themselves postmodern.
A. Ideological Capture
For many students, assertions of universal, trans-culturally valid,
or objective values have a tendency to come off sounding priggish,
sanctimonious, or dogmatic. For example, in the debate over the con-
firmation of John Ashcroft as United States Attorney General, his op-
ponents frequently labeled him as "moralistic." I recall a recent letter
to the New York Times which used this very word, but then went on to
excoriate Ashcroft for his homophobia. The letter struck me as ex-
ceedingly odd, since the very term "homophobia" implies a cluster of
moral arguments about the civic equality of gays and lesbians. One
cannot use the word "homophobia" intelligibly without presupposing
moral positions, but taking moral stances is supposed to be the fault
the letter writer finds in Ashcroft. 22
Upon reflection, however, I could understand the sentiments ex-
pressed in the letter as the result of the quite effective capture, by the
political Right, of the rhetoric of values. The appalling suggestion by
Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell that American sinfulness was the
cause of the September 11 terrorist attacks is the sort of pseudo-ethi-
cal reasoning that quite naturally alienates many students from the
language of right and wrong. To cite another example, a book by Wil-
liam Bennett, with ajacket blurb from Rush Limbaugh, is entitled The
De-Valuing of America, as if the cultural trends that Bennett deplores
are actually the result of a lack of values, rather than the conclusion of
a moral argument based on a different set of values. Or, consider Rob-
ert Bork's screed Slouching Towards Gomorrah, sounding the familiar
revealed to date about the Enron case does suggest some clear moral evaluations of the
major participants.
22. To be fair, the letter writer criticized Ashcroft for being "moralistic," not for en-
gaging in moral reasoning. A moralistic person can be defined as someone who is aroused
to anger and motivated to censure others over a wide variety of things that others regard as
matters of moral indifference. See BLACKBURN, RP, supra note 3, at 13. Although this exam-
ple may not be precisely on point, I have heard numerous disparaging references to con-
servative Republicans' tendency to assert moral claims. The mocking of Dan Quayle's
(admittedly strident) critique of the entertainment industry may be a better case in point.
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social conservative theme that American society has lost sight of moral
values.23 A theme that is constantly heard in the popular media from
the Right is that the Left is characterized by its lack of ethics, as op-
posed to being characterized by moral principles with which conserva-
tives disagree. Finally there is the cultural force of romanticism: In
general the language of objectivity sounds constraining, and appears
to be the means by which those in authority maintain their power over
those who seek to follow the path of inspiration. 24 It is therefore un-
derstandable that the political opponents of social conservatives, and
in particular the younger generation opponents of the ancien regime,
would adopt a debunking attitude toward claims about objectivity and
truth in morality.
As a moment's reflection will reveal, there is no reason that only
the Right should talk in terms of values. Consider this famous passage:
There are those who are asking the devotees of civil rights, "When
will you be satisfied?" We can never be satisfied as long as our bod-
ies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging in the mo-
tels of the highways and the hotels of the cities. We cannot be
satisfied as long as the Negro's basic mobility is from a smaller
ghetto to a larger one. We can never be satisfied as long as a Negro
in Mississippi cannot vote and a Negro in New York believes he has
nothing for which to vote. No, no, we are not satisfied, and we will
not be satisfied until justice rolls down like waters and righteous-
ness like a mighty stream. 25
This is an elaborate ethical argument for racial equality, delivered by
one of the great moral heroes of the twentieth century. Yet the reac-
tion of many self-styled liberals, progressives, or radicals has been to
avoid the explicit appeal to moral values. It is ironic that, although
many students who espouse ethical relativism identify themselves with
the political Left, the unrelenting opposition to objectivity and truth
in ethics that is a feature of relativism has the perhaps unintended
effect of defanging any ethical criticism of existing structures of
power. If nothing can be said about the norms of a polity, society, or
culture other than they are just or unjust only "according to its lights,"
then there seems to be little purchase for a critic who wishes to argue
that "the lights" are part of the problem. The result is that certain
kinds of leftist thought, often those calling themselves modern or
postmodern, are quietistic in their orientation toward structures of
23. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TowARDs GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).
24. See NozIcK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 9, at 21-23.
25. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I Have a Dream, in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 218-19 (James Melvin ed., 1992)
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dominance and oppression. 26 Relativism defangs ethics, by making it
something about which it is impossible to be wrong.27 If someone on
the political Left is a relativist, how is she supposed to speak truth to
power? The response of the powerful would simply be, "It's not wrong
by our lights, so take a hike!" Those who eschew ethics forget that it
would be impossible to formulate King's critique without a foundation
in moral reasons that are shared by the oppressor and the oppressed.
The wariness of law students toward the discourse of values is re-
inforced by the tendency of legal education to translate ethical ques-
tions into purely legal ones. And once they are in the legal classroom,
students absorb the message that the law is malleable, indeterminate,
unstable, and arbitrary from the standpoint of morality-in short, a
foundation of shifting sand upon which to build any kind of norma-
tive system. 28 Law students have a natural tendency to respond favora-
bly to the obvious virtues of legality. By the time they take upper level
professional responsibility courses, they have learned the enduring
lessons of the legal process theorists, that freedom is best safeguarded
by assigning limited roles to various legal institutions and preventing
any one of them from acquiring too much power over the daily lives
of individuals. This is the sort of argument that underlies one kind of
moral argument in favor of the right to choose: We think abortion
poses difficult moral and theological questions, about which reasona-
ble people can disagree, and we think that the role of government in a
case like this should be to step back and let people make agonizing
decisions without facing coercive state power.
The problem comes when law students forget how to translate
backwards. Although it may be true that there are reasons, specific to
the virtues of the rule of law, for distrusting the power of the state to
make judgments about moral questions, that does not mean that these
judgments are in principle incapable of having a rational foundation.
There are good reasons not to give too much power to the govern-
ment to decide contested moral issues. It is emphatically not the case,
however, that one of these reasons is that no moral argument is any
better or worse than another. Remember, if there were no better or
worse moral reasons, then there would be nothing wrong with giving
the government power to decide these issues. It might be foolish or ill
considered, but not wrong, since evaluative terms like right and wrong
26. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE 11 (1997).
27. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 23 (1988) for the related argument.
28. See Roger Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEG.
EDUC. 247, 254-56 (1978).
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presuppose standards of rational acceptability of moral arguments. So
a legal process or libertarian argument for limiting government power
cannot support attitudes of skepticism toward ethics. Nevertheless,
Roger Cramton is probably correct to point out that legal education
tends to get students out of the habit of making ethical arguments,
since the only arguments traditionally admissible in the law school
classroom are those which make reference to legal concepts. This ten-
dency can be particularly pronounced in a professional responsibility
course, in light of the frequent use of the imprecise term "legal ethics"
to describe the law governing lawyers. A teacher in such a course may
have to make an extra effort to focus student attention on moral argu-
mentation that stands apart from legal analysis.
B. Multiculturalism and Toleration
The multiculturalism movement has provided a welcome correc-
tive to the dominance of a particular set of values and norms in politi-
cal, historical, and aesthetic discourse. Indeed, it can be seen as a
corrective to the rhetoric of social conservatives, who claim that their
moral positions are objectively and universally true, that their canoni-
cal dead white male authors are the only ones that should be taught in
universities, and that history basically proceeded without the involve-
ment of women and people of color. Unfortunately, this benign form
of multiculturalism has a tendency to shade into moral relativism
rather easily, at least in classroom discussions of ethics. To see how
this elision is possible, it is useful to distinguish two varieties of mul-
ticulturalism-weak and strong. The central claim of weak multicul-
turalism is that other cultures might have something important to
offer, such as insights into leading a good human life, and we should
not be so blinded by our prejudices and preconceptions that we fail to
recognize alternative conceptions of value that could inform our own
lives. Frequently, however, the proponents of multiculturalism make
the strong claim that cultures can be evaluated only by internal stan-
dards, and that there is no such thing as an argument that can be
evaluated using trans-cultural standards. The strong claim is suscepti-
ble to the caricature of multiculturalism, familiar from the "culture
wars" of the 1990s, as a Balkanization of interest groups into warring
camps that are unable to talk to each other.
The strong claim of cultural relativism does not follow logically
from the "rather unsurprising observation" that societies are consti-
tuted differently and sometimes have difficulty understanding one an-
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other.29 Nevertheless, arguments for relativism in ethics frequently
make use of anthropological evidence. One variation on this argu-
ment is to point out the alien and "untranslatable" or incommensura-
ble moral concepts used by another culture-for example, the
commands of a deity, honor in the Mediterranean or the Antebellum
South in the United States, or face in some Asian cultures. This form
of the argument is subject to the devastating response that its propo-
nents always seem to manage to translate the concept adequately into
English. 30 If translation is possible, there must be a way to represent
the foreign concept in a way that makes sense to its interpreters; if
that is so, then there must be a set of concepts in common to both
speakers, to which all parties can refer in making moral arguments.
We may disagree about a moral question-say, whether honorjustifies
killing an adulterous spouse 31-but we understand how the question
is framed. When we encounter another culture or tradition, we assess
its ethical concepts by translation, using our own concepts as a starting
point.
I have no quarrel with the weak claim of multiculturalism, that
other ways of life are interestingly different from ours, and may reveal
previously unappreciated problems with our moral self-understand-
ing.32 When thoughtful people from other cultures come up with dif-
ferent answers to the ethical questions we are asking, it is well to
consider whether they may be on to something. This principle of ex-
tending at least provisional respect for seemingly different systems of
belief can even be an ideal of the philosophical method, as Russell
argues:
When an intelligent man expresses a view which seems to us obvi-
ously absurd, we should not attempt to prove that it is somehow
true, but we should try to understand how it ever came to seem true.
This exercise of historical and psychological imagination at once
enlarges the scope of our thinking, and helps us to realize how
29. Ronald Dworkin, Do Liberal Values Conflict?, in THE LEGACY OF ISAIAH BERLIN 73,
76-77 (Mark Lilla et al. eds., 2001). Bernard Williams calls this argument the anthropolo-
gist's heresy. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 20 (1972).
30. See Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES INTO
TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183 (1984).
31. Note that I did not say "whether honor requires killing." It may be true that within
one's culture an imperative of honor is felt as an ethical necessity, but it is still open to
question whether that command is justified. The extension of a concept like "honor" may be
relative to one's culture, but that observation alone does not warrant the further conclu-
sion that killing an adulterous spouse is morally justified.
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 30 (1991).
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foolish many of our own cherished prejudices will seem to an age
which has a different temper of mind.3 3
It is important, however, not to conflate this observation about the
virtue of being charitable toward the seemingly strange beliefs of
others into what Bernard Williams calls "vulgar relativism," a non-rela-
tive imperative of toleration that seeks to command everyone (regard-
less of the culture in which they are situated) to be equally respectful
of others' ethical beliefs. 34
The problems with this kind of argument are well known.3 5 First,
relativism quickly collapses into subjectivism or existentialism because
there seems to be no reason to terminate the chain of justification
with the conventions and practices of a cultural or national group. 36
What if there is disagreement within a culture? (Think of the joyous
reaction in cities such as Kabul when the Taliban was overthrown, and
compare it with the attitude in some rural villages in Afghanistan,
where the values enforced by the Taliban were part of traditional local
culture.) Presumably dissident groups would argue that the truth of
ethical claims ought to be relative to their understanding of their cul-
ture's values. And then there could be factions within that dissident
group, and so on, down to the level of the individual.3 7 In a complex
and diverse culture, how would someone know whose ethical claims to
pay attention to? Furthermore, if a relativist wishes not to be a subjec-
tivist, he must explain why the ethical claims of a group have priority
to those of the individual. 38 Ironically, the reasons he gives will proba-
bly be sufficiently general to support ethical arguments that are valid
across cultures and traditions as well, so he will find his argument
against subjectivism undermining his argument for relativism.
33. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 39 (1945).
34. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 158-59 (1985); Wit,
LIAMS, supra note 29, at 20-25.
35. See, e.g., WONG, supra note 3, at 177-97.
36. This kind of subjectivism is associated with Hobbes.
[W]hatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire that is it which he for
his part calleth good, and the object of his hate and aversion, evi/; and of his con-
tempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are
ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply
and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the
nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man ....
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Part I, Ch. vi., para. [7], at 28 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994)
(1668).
37. See Leslie Green, Internal Minorities and Their Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
CULTURES 257 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995).
38. See Yael Tamir, Siding with the Underdogs, in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICUL-
TURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 47 (Joshua Cohen et a]. eds., 1999).
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Second, if one wishes to argue from the apparent diversity of
viewpoints on ethics that people should not impose their views on
others, the argument is incoherent. It is self-contradictory because it
seeks to establish a universal moral principle-"it is wrong to seek to
require people to do something of which you cannot persuade them
through reasoning"-in response to the observed absence of a univer-
sal perspective from which these kinds of claims can be asserted. If the
principle is stated differently-"one should not interfere with reasona-
ble choices made within a valid way of life"-then again the argument
runs into the problem that it depends on cross cultural standards of
reasonableness and validity for ways of life. The attitude of toleration
and respect for difference is an ethical ideal, but one which applies
across the differences in observed first order ethical beliefs. 39 So, an
argument that a good (national or global) society would be one in
which people could agree to differ and could resolve their disputes
peacefully is an argument based on ethical reasons, such as the prior-
ity of reasoned and orderly resolution of disputes and the value of
respect and open mindedness. This latter argument is what I have
called the weak version of multiculturalism; it is philosophically unob-
jectionable and contains a great deal of truth. But it does not support
the strong relativist claim that observed differences in moral beliefs
terminates the discussion.
The apparent diversity of human practices and beliefs about eth-
ics nevertheless tends to make one hesitant to claim that ethics is capa-
ble of delivering conclusions that are objectively true or false. As John
Mackie argues, "radical differences between first order moral judg-
ments make it difficult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of
objective truths."40 Of course, there might nevertheless be a fact of the
matter, despite the disagreement; it could be the case that Culture A is
right in its ethical judgment about X, while Cultures B, C, . . . Z are
wrong. But it seems hubristic to assert ethical claims too confidently,
given the observed diversity of ethical belief. Ultimately, what appears
to be a core of truth in ethical relativism can be stated as ethical plu-
ralism, the claim that there is a diversity of human goods, a plurality of
wholly incompatible, but genuinely good ways of life, and a wide vari-
ety of moral ideals. Virtues or ideals such as liberty and equality, fair-
ness and welfare, temperance and courage, and justice and mercy may
coexist in a moral system, yet be incompatible in many cases of con-
flict between them. The standard examples of divergent ways of life
39. See BLACKBURN, RP, supra note 3, at 21.
40. MACKIE, supra note 7, at 36 (English spelling in original altered).
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are the moral ideals underlying fourteenth century Florentine moral-
ity, emphasizing conceptions of virtl (political action 41), Christian
conceptions of humility and brotherly love, Homeric heroic virtues,
and the character traits that emerge in the Socratic dialogues. "The
virtues of the Homeric epics and of the Sermon on the Mount are
irreducibly divergent and conflicting, and they express radically differ-
ent forms of life. There is no Archimedean point of leverage from
which they can be judged."42 Not only do different cultures embody
incompatible ways of life, but these ideals may exist within one cul-
ture, making possible different, and incompatible models of human
excellence. "Within any complex culture, there will typically be a di-
versity of forms of life, each with its associated virtues and excellences,
available to many people, but it will not be possible to combine these
forms of life within the compass of a single biography."43 Conflicts
among these competing values and ideals cannot be resolved by some
kind of unitary master value or conception of the good life
(eudaimonia). Thus, we can locate one source of moral disagreement
and the diversity of ethical beliefs in the diversity of moral ideals to
which people may be committed.
Significantly, pluralism is compatible with a kind of limited ethi-
cal objectivity, in the sense that certain ways of life are morally worthy
for humans to pursue, while others are worthless or evil. It does not
rule out the possibility of making rational trans-cultural comparisons
of values and finding some ethical ideals deficient, from the point of
view of genuine human good, although there may be more than one
conception of human flourishing from which ethical ideals may be
derived. "[T]wo moral principles might both be 'objective,' in any
case more than a matter of mere 'individual preference,' and yet we
might not have a way of rationally settling conflicts that arise between
the directives they yield in particular circumstances. '44 Pluralism is
not the same as conventionalism-the goodness of ethical ideals and
desirable forms of life does not inhere solely in the fact that a particu-
lar culture or group has subscribed to them or pursued them as an
idea. We will return to the theme of pluralism after developing an
account of ethical reasoning in the next section. For now, we can ex-
amine another source of the climate of relativism, the debate over
41. In Machiavelli, "the skill and courage by which men are enabled to dominate
events and fortune." J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 92 (1975).
42. JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 45-46 (1996) (summarizing Berlin's position).
43. Id. at 54; see also CHARLES E. LARsoRE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 35 (1987).
44. LARmoRE, supra note 43, at 28.
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universal rights or values in international law and the claim that these
values are simply parochial concerns of developed nations, cloaked in
the spurious assertion of universality.
C. Imperialism: The Special Problem of "Universal Rights" in
International Law
In the international law arena, assertions of universal moral val-
ues or human rights strikes a dissonant chord with developing na-
tions, who associate the rhetoric of universality with Western values
and imperialist foreign policies. "The development of international
law relied on European ideals as universals and these standards were
imposed by colonialism and conequest [sic]." 4 5 The pronounced
rightward tilt of American politics does nothing to reassure other na-
tions that we are espousing genuinely universal rights and values. For
example, a school board in Florida adopted a resolution declaring
that state-mandated instruction about other cultures "shall include
and instill in our students an appreciation of our American heritage
and culture such as: our republican form of government, capitalism, a
free-enterprise system, patriotism, strong family values, freedom of re-
ligion and other basic values that are superior to other foreign or historic
cultures."46 Although not so blatantly jingoistic, George Bush's 2002
State of the Union address also included contested political princi-
ples, such as the right to private property, within a list of supposedly
universal moral truths. World reaction (particularly in light of Bush's
"axis of evil" label for Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) was predictable:
The United States is acting like a unilateralist bully, using the asser-
tion of universal values as a smokescreen for purely self-interested
power politics.
It is hard to disagree with the proposition that the foreign policy
of the United States has not always shown respect for the ethical posi-
tions elaborated by other nations, assuming instead simply that we are
right and they are wrong. We Americans should also be mindful of the
common sense maxim that people who live in glass houses should not
throw stones. If, for example, we criticize the Chinese government for
jailing people who simply wish to practice breathing exercises in pub-
lic, we must be prepared to turn this kind of critical scrutiny inward
and ask whether it is just to execute mentally retarded prisoners,
45. Hilary Charlesworth, Martha Nussbaum's Feminist Internationalism, 111 ETHICS 64,
74 (2000).
46. Quoted in NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS Now 1 (1997) (em-
phasis added).
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maintain a system of capital punishment that is almost totally indiffer-
ent to the value of effective counsel for defendants, tolerate stagger-
ing gaps in wealth and access to resources like education and health
care (which often exist along racial lines), ignore the impact of our
economic activities on the environment, and accept no sense of being
part of a global community with developing nations.
Having said this, it is nevertheless important not to let the pendu-
lum swing too far in the other direction, and assume that a claim in-
volving rights, or "Western" values is automatically illegitimate when
applied in a different national context. For one thing, I am fairly con-
fident that it is better to be healthy than sick, despite relativist claims
such as one French anthropologist's statement that the introduction
of smallpox vaccine into India by the British was an occasion for re-
gret because it eradicated the cult of Sittala Devi, the goddess to
whom the afflicted would pray for relief of smallpox. 47 In addition, for
every instance in which an assertion of a cross-cultural universal was
made to mask imperialist domination, there are other cases in which
the language of universal values and rights has been used as a means
of liberation by colonial subjects. Writing of the ideology of the rule of
law, the English historian E.P. Thompson had this to say:
Transplanted as it was to even more inequitable contexts, this law
could become an instrument of imperialism. For this law has found
its way to a good many parts of the globe. But even here the rules
and the rhetoric have imposed some inhibitions upon the imperial
power. If the rhetoric was a mask, it was a mask which Gandhi and
Nehru were to borrow, at the head of a million masked
supporters. 48
Indeed, many of the claims advanced by oppressed persons in the de-
veloping world-women, ethnic and linguistic minorities, political dis-
sidents, and the like-rely on patterns of ethical reasoning that would
be readily recognized in American political discourse. 49 It may be
these patterns of ethical reasoning, not the exotic-sounding rituals
such as female genital mutilation and praying to Sittala Devi, that are
47. The statement was made in a paper presented to an international conference on
values and technology, and described in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 35
(1999). As Nussbaum reports, the paper has since been published. See F.A. Marglin, Small-
pox in Two Systems of Knowledge, in DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND
RESISTANCE 102 (Frederique Apffel Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1990).
48. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975).
49. See J.M. ROBERTS, TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1901 TO
2000, 519-20, 553-54 (1999) (observing that the rejection by Asian countries of Western
domination was expressed in terms borrowed from Western thought, such as Marxism or
nationalism).
Spring 2002] TEACHING VALUES SYMPOSIUM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
the most constitutive of a foreign culture.5 0 Ironically, cynical appeals
to artificially constructed homogeneous cultural traditions have fre-
quently been employed by oppressive regimes to manipulate the ap-
pearance of political legitimacy.5 1 In any event, the normative claims
made within a culture are generally intended to apply universally, not
only to people within the same culture. 52 For example, conservative
Pashtuns do not believe that only their own women should wear the
burqha, but that all women should display similar modesty. Thus, it is
difficult to say anything universal about arguments from universal
values.
Not all skeptical arguments in international affairs rely on disa-
greement with the particular values that are promoted by a powerful
nation. Many observers point instead to the hypocrisy, inconsistency,
cynicism, and aggression of nations and politicians, and suggest that
there is no such thing as morality in international relations, only
"power politics." Of course, there has always been a significant tradi-
tion of realpolitik in international affairs, which argues that power and
national interest are the only standards by which the conduct of na-
tions may be judged.5 3 Morality is therefore said to be irrelevant (and
perhaps even dangerous) in international relations. It is important,
however, not to assume that morality in international relations neces-
sarily is equivalent to "utopian ideals and sentimental slogans. '54 Even
the hard nosed realist position is underwritten by moral arguments
for the priority of one's own nation, the necessity of using violence to
advance legitimate national interests, the permissibility of deception
and threats in dealing with one's adversaries, and so on. Properly un-
derstood, these are not arguments from the absence of morality, but
from ordinary morality as applied to the special setting of interna-
tional relations. Ordinary moral principles, such as the prohibition on
lying or obtaining one's way through threats of violence, contain ex-
ceptions for compelling cases, such as the familiar example of lying to
the Gestapo about the presence ofJews in one's basement. In interna-
tional affairs, the importance of defending one's homeland or pro-
tecting a valuable way of life may permit what would otherwise be
50. See Let Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2000).
51. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 47, at 35-37.
52. See Alasdair Maclntyre, Moral Relativism, Truth, and Justification, in THE MACINT'YRE
READER 202 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998); JEREMY WALDRON, Particular Values and Critical Moral-
ity, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 168 (1993).
53. See Marshall Cohen, Moral Skepticism and International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL
ETHICS 3 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985).
54. Id. at 7.
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moral wrongdoing. In short, there is no reason to think a moral prin-
ciple must be absolute in order to count as a moral principle instead
of a move in a game of power politics.
There are parallels here between international affairs and profes-
sional ethics, which are worth drawing out. Politicians and lawyers
claim special dispensations from the strictures of ordinary morality, so
that they may be permitted to perform actions (ordering the assassina-
tion of an enemy, obfuscating the evidence to create a mistaken belief
in the mind of jurors at trial) that would be condemned by moral
principles if they were engaged in by a private citizen not acting pur-
suant to some kind of political or professional role. Although some
scholars refer to the lawyer's position as an "amoral role," it is not
amoral at all; rather, it is justified by a complex moral argument based
on the structure and function of political institutions within a society
and the necessity of creating classes of experts who can work within
those institutions to realize the ends for which they are constituted.55
Ordinary morality and legal (or political) morality do not occupy dis-
tinct spheres. Or, to put it another way, norms that are internal to the
evaluation of lawyers and politicians are not hermetically separated
from ordinary moral standards. They may incorporate ordinary moral-
ity by reference, and indeed they must if the political or legal institu-
tions are themselves justified.5 6 In the case of lawyers, consider a
plausible internal norm: "You may cross-examine a witness to discredit
her testimony in the eyes of the jury, even if you are convinced she is
telling the truth." This norm would be morally justified only if the
practice of which it is a part-adversary trials-is itself a morally justi-
fied aspect of the legal system. This is not the place to rehash the
arguments that are made for and against the adversary system, in
terms of whether it is justified by virtue of its capacity to determine
factual truth, protect individual rights from overreaching by the state,
serve certain therapeutic goals, and so on. The point is merely that the
standards by which any practice is evaluated are ultimately connected
with ordinary morality, not freely floating and amoral.
55. See Steven L. Pepper, The Lawryer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986); see also ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS
FOR ADvERSMARES (1999).
56. See Cohen, supra note 53, at 14-15. (There are numerous distinct social groups or
practices with internal normative standards-for example, criminal drug gangs, right wing
"patriot" militias, and racist hate groups-which cannot claim moral justification for their
actions, because their own internal standards are not justified on ordinary moral
grounds.).
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D. Skepticism About Foundations
Law students have undoubtedly been exposed as undergraduates
to various strands of "postmodern" thought in such disciplines as liter-
ature, history, political science, ethnic and gender studies, and sociol-
ogy. One feature of postmodernism (although I hesitate to generalize
about this "movement") is its critique of the foundations that had
once given a degree of certainty to theorizing about morals. 57 No one
believes in Platonic forms, and our times are notoriously skeptical of
religious authority as the basis for believing in truths of ethics. The
model of empirical science seems inapt as an account of objective
truth in ethics.58 Besides, the objectivity of science has been ques-
tioned with equal vigor. What's more, we have become accustomed to
seeing formerly cherished ethical "truths" refuted-consider the be-
liefs about the inferiority of women and African Americans that have
been under attack since the middle of the twentieth century. Finally,
arguments within moral philosophy have cast considerable doubt on
the existence of "moral facts," reference to which justifies ethical judg-
ments. The best known is John Mackie's "argument from queerness":
If there are moral facts, and they are facts like any other, it is hard to
see how the accurate perception of them should motivate action. If
they are different somehow from ordinary facts, so that they were suf-
ficient to motivate someone to act in a certain way, then they are
strange "facts" indeed.59 Arguments like this one have caused many to
doubt whether ethics can be given a secure, objective basis in the ex-
ternal world, akin to the grounding of the natural sciences.
It is not only ethics that is afflicted by the skepticism about foun-
dations-the theory of knowledge (epistemology) and the philosophy
of natural sciences have struggled to understand how we know things
to be true, and have rejected many of the common sense answers that
have typically been offered. For example, one might think that a be-
lief or a proposition of fact ("there is a desk in my office") is true if it
corresponds to how things actually are in the world (there is a desk in
57. I have drawn much of this discussion from the work of Christopher Norris, an
acute critic of postnodernism, although the outlines of the anti-foundationalist argument
should be familiar from the legal literature of the past couple of decades. See generally
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE
ENDS OF PHILOSOPHY (1990); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY & PRACTICE
(1982); see also the discussion of Derrida in BARRY ALLEN, TRUTH IN PHILOSOPHY 96-112
(1993).
58. See Darwall et al., supra note 6, at 128-29; see also PUTNAM, RHF, supra note 4, at
163-78.
59, See MACKIE, supra note 7, at 38-42.
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my office). This is certainly how many people who have never
wandered into the philosophical bramble bush of theories of truth
imagine that statements are shown to be true. But there is a well
known objection to the correspondence theory of truth that can be
raised here. How is it that we come to have two separate thoughts-
having the belief in our minds (thinking, "there is a desk in my of-
fice") and having a picture of the way things actually are-at the same
time, but from different points of view?60 The correspondence theory
of truth posits a mysterious standpoint we supposedly occupy when we
judge that our belief bears the right relation to the facts about the
world as it is. When we verify a belief-when I bang my fist on the
desk and pronounce, "there is a desk in my office"-we are occupying
only the standpoint of a person who judges that things are so; we do
not have unmediated access to the world of how things actually are.
To put it another way, saying that my belief that there is a desk in
my office is true if it corresponds to the existence of a desk in my office
does not tell us how we are supposed to ascertain whether there is a
desk in my office. If the answer is, "look around your office and see if
there is a desk," then the only perspective from which I can ascertain
the truth of that belief is the point of view of the person doing the
investigating and the judging. If the answer is, rather, that there is a
desk in my office if in fact there is a desk in my office, then we can
reasonably ask how it is possible to transcend the perspective of a nor-
mally constituted human being poking around his office to see if
there is a desk. The correspondence theory imagines that we can put
our belief in the existence of a desk alongside the fact of there being a
desk and verify that they match somehow. But it fails to explain how it
is that we can go beyond beliefs, and processes of testing and justifying
our beliefs, to the pure realm of facts. I will have much more to say on
the subject of verification and justification throughout this Part, be-
ginning with the "deflationist" response which attempts to meet this
objection head on. For now, however, it is sufficient to point out that
the seemingly natural notion of truth as "correspondence with the way
things actually are" is beset with significant theoretical difficulties.
Similarly, the early twentieth century movement in American phi-
losophy known as pragmatism has been hugely influential in the legal
academy, attracting supporters on the Left and Right of the political
60. See SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD: GROUNDINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 224-26 (1984) [hereinafter BLACKBURN, SW].
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spectrum.6 1 Pragmatism begins by asking what difference truth
makes6 2 -why ought we be concerned that a statement such as "tor-
turing small children for fun is wrong" is true or false? The answer is
that ideas are true insofar as they help us make sense of the relation-
ship between that idea and other aspects of our experience. 63 Ideas
are true instrumentally, to the extent that they link disparate parts of
our lives in a coherent manner. This is not to say that truth is arbi-
trary; rather, "[t]rue ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate,
corroborate and verify."64 In James's famous expression, truth has a
"cash value. '65 That means that the consequences of holding the be-
lief are better for its holder than the consequences of not holding it.66
Methodologically pragmatism is empiricist; it takes concrete, par-
ticular experience as relative more central to philosophy than a priori
principles and highly abstract categories. 67 It defines truth as the ter-
minus of an ideal inquiry, rather than correspondence with the world,
and insists that justification be holistic, not a case by case matter.
These are philosophical positions-they have consequences for famil-
iar debates about truth, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind and
language. 68 James's theory is not "anti-philosophy," and it has particu-
lar implications for ethics.69 One can be a pragmatic ethicist by adopt-
61. See generally THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW,
AND CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw (1995).
62. See, e.g., William James, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM: A READER 93, 94
(Louis Menand ed., 1997).
63. See id. at 100.
64. Id. at 112, 114.
65. Id.
66. See Bertrand Russell, William James's Conception of Truth, in TRUTH 69, 74 (Simon
Blackburn & Keith Simmons eds., 1999). One can tell an evolutionary story about truth
that explains why we might have come to value truth, although it does not necessarily
define truth: "It seems reasonable to think that our original interest in truth was instru-
mentally based. Truths served us better than falsehoods and better than no beliefs at all in
coping with the world's dangers and opportunities." ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RA-
TIONALITY 68 (1993). This story brings to mind a picture of a caveman evaluating the state-
ment, "Here comes a sabre-toothed tiger!" Of course, from his point of view, it is better to
act on a true statement of that form, by running like hell. But the evolutionary story does
not mean that good practical consequences are constitutive of truth, for the reasons noted
by Russell.
67. SeeJames, supra note 62, at 96-97.
68. See David Luban, hat's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 61, at 275,
278.
69. Stanley Fish's repeated insistence that principles are just rhetorical smokescreens
may loosely be called one form of pragmatism-Luban calls it "primitive pragmatism."
David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme By Holmes), 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1001, 1007-08 (1996). It is not, however, whatJames and Dewey were talking about.
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ing a particular view about the justification of ethical beliefs, in which
justification depends on context and the data of experience, in addi-
tion to foundational principles, such as human dignity.70 This is not
the same as saying that context is all there is, so that "philosophy" in
the sense of more abstract theoretical considerations has no role to
play in ethics.
Pragmatism presents a number of recognized difficulties as a the-
ory of truth. Stating the claim of pragmatism too strongly does risk
lapsing into the error of relativism, in the conventions of some social
group are the sole criteria of truth. Conventions can be jettisoned or
modified at will; there seems nothing that constrains the adoption of a
particular convention. Serbian conventions are good for Serbs, but
surely there is more to say than that when thinking about whether
Milosevic's militant nationalism embodied true beliefs about what
ought to be done. Serb beliefs are not good for humans generally, but
of course that rejoinder begs the question of the appropriate frame to
adopt when evaluating whether an idea is good for us-who is the
relevant "us"? There seems to be nothing in the pragmatic method
that requires the question of the goodness of a belief to be assessed
relative to people outside one's own social, tribal, ethnic, or national
group. In addition, it is odd to make the ascription of truth to a belief
dependent upon good consequences. For one thing, "good" is a term
like "true" that stands in need of definition. Surely good cannot be
defined pragmatically, with reference to the goodness of conse-
quences, because that definition would be circular. Bertrand Russell, a
severe critic of pragmatism, observes that pragmatism also gets the
causal relationship of truth and belief backwards.7 1 The fact that Co-
lumbus sailed in 1492 is the cause of my true belief that Columbus
sailed in that year; pragmatism, by contrast, seems to imply that the
good that is brought about (whatever that may be) as a result of my
belief that Columbus sailed in 1492 causes a historical event to have
been the case. Finally, Russell also notices that many patently false
beliefs can have good consequences. Children derive a great deal of
pleasure out of their belief in Santa Claus and, Russell suggests, the
same is true of adults' belief in God. (Russell was famously irrelig-
ious.) These good consequences can be quite independent of the
truth of the belief asserted.
In any event, my intent here is not to do justice to the rich debate
over philosophical pragmatism, but to suggest how pragmatism, as
70. See DAVID LuBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 156 (1994) [hereinafter LEGAL MODERNISM].
71. See RUSSELL, supra note 33, at 817-18.
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part of a general Weltanschauung in higher education, may tempt stu-
dents down the primrose path of relativism. Pragmatism shares with
postmodernism a tendency to be misunderstood and misapplied.
Whatever else may be the consequences of pragmatism, it certainly
does not imply subjectivism or relativism in ethics. The pragmatic defi-
nition of truth, in ethics or metaphysics, requires a standard of truth
external to the thinker.72 Moreover, in some pragmatic definitions of
truth, such as John Dewey's concept of truth as warranted assertability,
it is clear that truth is conceptually independent of majority opinion
on the subject.73 This is because majority opinion on the subject is
dependent upon something, otherwise there would be no agreement.
In Hilary Putnam's example, whether one's cultural peers would
agree with the statement "my kitchen needs painting" must depend
on whether the paint is dingy and peeling, and those facts, in turn,
must depend on physical laws that are independent of the opinion of
one's cultural peers.74 In any event, the familiarity of pragmatism in
universities, particularly law schools, seems to have accustomed stu-
dents to thinking of truth as being relative to communities. The next
Part considers the complex relationship between truth, communities,
and the physical world.
II. The Deflationist Response
The first three potential sources of the climate of relativism-as-
sociation with political conservativism and legitimate concerns ad-
vanced by multiculturalists and observers of international relations-
are susceptible to fairly brief responses. The broad intellectual trend
of antifoundationalism is another matter altogether. It is a sophisti-
cated attack on traditional sources of certainty and, as such, deserves a
careful reply. One such response is simply to jettison talk about foun-
dations from our conceptual vocabulary, understanding truth and ob-
jectivity along different lines. Suppose we are interested in asserting a
proposition, p, that no one is likely to deny: In mathematics it may be
"2 + 2 = 4," in ethics it may be "slavery is wrong." Consider the follow-
ing "ladder" of sentences:
1. p.
72. See Ruth Anna Putnam, The Moral Impulse, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW
ESSAYS ON SocIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 61, at 62, 64.
73. See JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 9 (1938); John Dewey, Proposi-
tions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth, 38J. PHIL. 169,181 (1941); PUTNAM, RHF, supra note
4, at 21-23.
74. See Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy 69-71 (1992).
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2. It is true that p.
3. It is a fact that it is true that p.
4. It corresponds to the eternal factual and normative order of the
universe that p.7
5
Philosophers who adopt a "deflationist" view of truth are inclined
to assert that none of the sentences above, beginning with #2, add
anything to p. The sentence, "Slavery is wrong" is equivalent to the
sentence, "It is true that slavery is wrong." Deflationism simply shifts
the focus from the loaded word true to the kinds of arguments we
would employ if we were interested in defending p. We can, of course,
disagree about the underlying proposition, p---someone may deny it,
and say that slavery is not so bad after all. But what would be the re-
sponse to that denial? The proponent of p would not simply bang the
table and say "It is true that slavery is wrong." Rather, she would pa-
tiently explain why slavery is wrong, making reference to the violation
of human dignity it causes, the suffering it entails, perhaps to religious
revelation, historical examples, the effect on the character of the
slaveholders, and so on.
These arguments, which rely on the moral reasons for slavery's
wrongness, would lend support to two different conclusions-"slavery
is wrong" and "'slavery is wrong' is true." Since the pattern ofjustifica-
tion is the same, deflationists ask why we should not dispense with the
"is true" predicate in the second sentence. 76 You take the first proposi-
tion out of quotation marks and then go about investigating whether
it is true:
"Slavery is wrong" is true if and only if slavery is wrong.
75. The ladder image and this example are from Simon Blackburn. See BLACKBURN,
RP, supra note 3, at 78; Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons, Introduction, in TRUTH 1, 4
(Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons eds., 1999). The arguments in this Part are not Black-
burn's, or Hilary Putnam's (who is also cited frequently in this section), or those of any
other specific philosopher. They are rather my amalgamation of a number of related posi-
tions in metaethics, put together with the aim of showing how one might respond to the
desire for an objective foundation for ethical judgments.
76. The disquotational approach to the truth of sentences originates in a paper pub-
lished in the 1940s by the Polish logician Alfred Tarski, entitled "The Semantic Conception
of Truth," in 4 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 341 (1944); see also ALFRED TARsri, The
Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, in LOGiC, SEMANTICS, METAMATHEMATICS U.H.
Woodgen trans., 1956). To be more precise, I am talking here about "methodological
deflationism," not a purely disquotational theory of truth. See Blackburn & Simmons, supra
note 75, at 18; Hartry Field, Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content, in TRUTH, supra note
75, at 351. Also, to avoid complications, in this essay I am not taking a position on whether
the relevant bearer of meaning is a belief, sentence, statement, proposition, or other to-
ken. I am being deliberately loose here, with the idea being only that truth in ethics is
something ascribed to an evaluation, whether the evaluation is in the form of a belief,
statement, or even an emotional reaction that is not articulated in propositional form.
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This odd way of stating the truth conditions of the sentence "slavery is
wrong" is supposed to focus attention on the uselessness of the predi-
cate "true" in a domain such as epistemology or ethics. Truth does not
refer to some general property; rather, it is a predicate we apply to
indicate our justified commitment to a proposition about the world or
about values. If we are interested in the truth of the proposition "slav-
ery is wrong," what else is there to do but try to figure out whether
slavery is wrong? The resulting method is an empirical theory of
meaning, in which the meaning of any sentence is given by its truth
conditions.7 7 We can tell something about the meaning of sentences
only if we can explain how people manage to speak and understand a
language. Consider the example often given in epistemology, which I
believe was introduced by Quine:78
"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white.
In this example we should unpack the meaning of the whole sen-
tence by reference to the processes of interpretation, understanding,
verification, and justification that we bring to bear on the words fol-
lowing "if and only if."79 The idea here is that the predicate "true"
does nothing more than direct us toward two sensible tasks: Under-
standing how competent speakers of a language use words, and figur-
ing out whether snow is white, using empirical processes of testing
and verification. Without knowing the standards by which someone
evaluates whether a statement is true, we do not know anything about
what it means for a statement to be true; no one wants to say "snow is
white" unless snow is really white, but that is all we mean by wondering
whether it is true that snow is white.80 We know snow is white because
we agree on the processes of observation, interpretation of observed
data, and assignment of descriptions to these interpreted observa-
tions. If this sounds grandiose when applied to an ordinary experi-
ence, consider how we know that E = mc 2, or that atoms are composed
of protons, neutrons, and electrons. We know that the latter statement
is true only because we agree that a certain observed track in an in-
77. See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, Truth and Meaning, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND IN-
TERPRETATION 17, 24-25 (1984).
78. For an application to ethics, see WONG, supra note 3, at 16-22.
79. See also DONALD DAVIDSON, The Inscrutability of Reference, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH
AND INTERPRETATION 227, 228 (1984) (referring to a "translation manual" and a theory of
truth as equivalent). It may help to see a theory of truth as providing an analogue to trans-
lation. The significance of Tarski's approach to truth finally made sense to me when a
professor in a graduate seminar suggested this gloss: "Schnee ist weiss" is true if and only if
snow is white.
80. See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, Fact and Value, in REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981)
[hereinafter PUTNAM, RTH].
[Vol. 36
strument such as a cloud chamber following a particular collision be-
tween atoms should be interpreted as revealing the existence of a
theoretically posited particle conventionally called an electron. That
agreement depends, in turn, on a great deal of theoretical argumenta-
tion, ridiculously complicated mathematics, and further observations
under specified laboratory conditions. The same is true for ordinary
observations about snow, but we overlook the background of shared
standards of interpretation that are presupposed by discourse about
the physical world. The point to underscore, however, is that even em-
pirical science-which some believe to establish truth by direct corre-
spondence with the physical world-depends on a number of initial
assumptions about how observations should be interpreted and corre-
lated with theoretical entities. It is not so simple as "reading off" the
truth from the world as it is in itself.
The nature of the tasks of verification and justification also
throws light on the inherent normativity of language,8 ' an important
point that will return when we consider truth-conditions for proposi-
tions of morality. In short, the meaning of language is a public mat-
ter-there is no such thing as a meaningful language that is not
shared with other persons. It is part of the nature of language that a
person may be mistaken in the way he uses words, for instance by say-
ing "snow is green." And whether the speaker made a mistake can be
assessed only in relation to the community of language users of which
the speaker is a part.8 2 Other users of the language check the
speaker's assertions, and it is the interaction among speakers of the
language, not some fact in the external world or the speaker's inten-
tion, that determines the truth of sentences. Significantly, this is the
case in epistemology as well as ethics. Even the truth aptitude of a
statement about the physical world, such as "snow is white," is ulti-
mately constituted by how that statement is used in a community of
speakers of a language.8 If snow seems too pedestrian, consider again
81. See, e.g., AKEEL BILGRAMI, BELIEF AND MEANING 83-122 (1992) (discussing norma-
tivity in recent epistemology but elaborating his own approach); SAUL KRiPKE, WITrTGEN-
STEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982); PUTNAM, RHF, supra note 4, at 115-17.
82. See KiPupE, supra note 82, at 75-78, 89-101; PUTNAM, RHF, supra note 4, at 185.
83. This is not the only way to be a deflationist, and the philosophers I have cited
throughout this section, such as Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and Blackburn, have very dif-
ferent approaches to the problem of truth. For example, many disagree with the view elab-
orated by Kripke, supposedly based on Wittgenstein's rule-following argument. My hope is
merely to show one way of responding to the student who expresses skepticism about "es-
sences" or foundations in ethics and therefore the possibility of non-relative ethical knowl-
edge. It is certainly not to defend a highly controversial position in epistemology,
metaphysics, or the philosophy of language.
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the example of atoms. The truth of the statement "atoms are made up
of protons, neutrons, and electrons" is given not only by experimental
data and observations, but by community standards regarding how
those observations should be interpreted and matched up with theo-
retical concepts.
Now, this obviously sounds like the relativist position I have tried
to avoid. Meaning and truth can be assessed only relative to the stan-
dards of rational acceptability endorsed by communities-is that not
the very argument the relativist has been advancing? As some defla-
tionists in ethics are quick to point out, however, they are simply shift-
ing the focus of the discussion to the reasons why one might want to
assert or believe a statement. In science, you can say "snow is white"
only if snow is white. In ethics, it is wrong to kick dogs not merely
because we have a certain reaction to the act; rather, we react the way
we do (condemning the dog kicker in moral terms) because kicking
dogs causes them pain.8 4 The standards of justification and verifica-
tion are not relative arbitrarily to the community's use of language;
rather, the community's use of language is constrained in some way by
the way the world is constituted. The capacity of dogs to feel pain is an
essential link in the justificatory chain supporting the statement, "it is
wrong to kick dogs," just as the physical structure of water is an essen-
tial aspect of the justification of the statement "snow is white."8 5 The
example of snow suggests an analogy between ethics and sensory per-
ception of the physical world. The color white is not part of the ex-
planatory and causal structure of the universe; if you ask a physicist
why you perceive snow as white, the explanation will have to do with
the wavelengths of light that are absorbed and reflected by the snow,
as well as the way our retinas and brains process sensory stimuli. Color
84. See Simon Blackburn, Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism, in WITrGENSTEIN: To
FOLLOW A RULE 163, 179 (Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981).
85. Nozick gives a fanciful example from the philosophy of language which, I think,
helps support Blackburn's argument about the non-arbitrariness, yet socially constituted
nature of ethical language:
[Slome other culture and language, it is said, might divide things quite differ-
ently, for instance having a term "zanzar" that refers to anything which is either a
chair or a river or half of a house. However, even if terms embody arbitrary divi-
sions of the world, it does not follow that the statements or propositions made
with these arbitrary terms are not true. Define an "ourth" as anything that is ei-
ther a chair or a river or half of a house or is identical with Grover Cleveland.
That is, according to us, an arbitrary term. Be that as it may, it is true that all
zanzars are ourths. And it also is true that the object in the corner of my office is a
zanzar, and that Grover Cleveland is an ourth but not a zanzar. The arbitrariness of
the constituent terms does not make the truth of these statements an arbitrary matter.
NoziCK, INVARIANCES, supra note 10, at 48 (emphasis added).
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is a secondary quality, dependent on our response to physical, or pri-
mary qualities of the object.86 Although the ascription of color is a
function of human language and perceptual capacities, our percep-
tion that snow is white is regulated by intersubjective standards of cor-
rect usage. The statement "snow is green" would be judged wrong in a
community of competent users of English. Thus, the inherent depen-
dence of color attribution on the psychological makeup of human be-
ings does not make the statement "snow is white" any less objectively
true. 87 For example, X is good if and only if well socialized people
would be disposed to choose X when faced with it. There is obviously
a lot of room for playing around with the definition of the terms in-
serted in brackets, as I suggested by the term "well socialized people."
A major challenge for those who are attracted to response dependent
concepts is to explain why particular choices are made for the brack-
eted terms. The dependence of a language on the conventions of a
particular group does not make meaning arbitrary, or relative to con-
vention. The sentence "2 + 5 = 7" could be expressed using different
symbols; the use of the symbol "2" to refer to the number 2 is simply a
convention. Yet the truth of the sentence "2 + 5 = 7" does not depend
on linguistic conventions.88
Similarly in ethics, the community's judgment is not arbitrary-
there is something to be wrong about. The statement "kicking dogs is
wrong" depends on the emotional and psychological constitution of
humans, but like the attribution of whiteness to snow, it is both
grounded in our experience of the external world (our perception of
the dogs' suffering) and justified by its place in a whole scheme of
ethical attributions that constitutes our moral life. The practice of
making moral judgments is "quasi-objectified," to paraphrase Black-
burn,89 by this multilateral relationship between our perception of the
relevant facts, the attitudes we express toward them, and the judg-
ments made by others about our attitudes. We subject our behavior
and ethical attitudes to the impartial scrutiny of others. 90 For exam-
ple, we would be judged callous if we were not moved to anger by the
sight of someone kicking a dog. It is important to recognize, too, that
86. SeeJohn McDowell, Values and Secondary Qualities, in EssAYS ON MORAL REALISM 166
(Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988).
87. See Darwall et al., Toward Fin de siecle Ethics. Some Trends, supra note 6, at 153. On
response-dependent concepts generally; see also Simon Blackburn, Circles, Finks, Smells and
Biconditionals, 7 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 259 (1993).
88. For this example, see BLACKBURN, SW, supra note 60, at 19.
89. Blackburn's term is "quasi-realism." See id. at 171.
90. See BLAcKBuRN, RP, supra note 3, at 204.
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the second order judgment of callousness is underwritten not by a
sense that the dog kicker is violating some social norm, but is doing
something wrong, in virtue of the dog's suffering. To put it another
way, if we believe we are talking about matters that depend only on
tacit agreement or social convention, we cannot possibly think we are
talking about anything of importance, 91 and would not be motivated
to express a judgment about a person who violated ethical standards.
On the other hand, we make ethical arguments precisely because we
believe there is something worth arguing about, namely the "human
values and significances" 92 that are implicated by our actions. This ar-
gument is developed further in the next section.
A. Deflationism and Moral Truth
The significance of the ladder image and the deflationist ap-
proach to truth for the anti-relativist position can be seen by inverting
the ladder. Imagine that someone utters the following series of
sentences:
1. Slavery is wrong.
2. Our opinion is this: slavery is wrong.
3. Slavery is wrong. That is just our opinion.
4. Slavery is wrong. "That is an opinion reflecting an independent
order of reason."9 3
In this case, all of the sentences in the ladder are either mislead-
ing or equivalent to #1. The deflationist would first maintain that #4 is
hopelessly confused because we have no access to the independent
order of things, the Platonic or Kantian universe of forms or things-in-
themselves. Next the task is to neutralize #3 by showing that it is
equivalent to #2. In other words, the epithet 'just" does not add any-
thing to the assertion of the opinion that slavery is wrong. The next
step is to show that #2 does not differ, in any respect that matters,
from #1. Thus, the key word in the ladder is "opinion." The relativist
means to say something shocking by asserting that "slavery is wrong" is
a matter of opinion. But what is meant by that predicate, and how
does it differ from the statement, "'slavery is wrong' is true" or "slavery
is wrong?"
Blackburn argues that it does not differ at all, because calling
something an opinion is not the same as asserting that it has no foun-
dation whatsoever in reason. The next question is, "On what is that
91. See Luban, LEGAL MODERNISM, supra note 70, at 133.
92. LARMORE, supra note 43, at 31.
93. BLACKBURN, RP, supra note 3, at 305.
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opinion founded?" If someone says that in his opinion slavery is not
wrong, we would immediately query him about the features of slavery
that make it morally acceptable. 94 There is still something to argue
about, even though we may label the competing positions "opinions,"
as Blackburn recognizes:
If the relativist is saying that it is just our opinion as opposed to a
good or better opinion that approves of slavery, we are in a moral
dispute, certainly. But it is then up to him to locate this good or
better opinion and defend it, and this we know he will be unable to
do, for we are certain that slavery is a bad system. If he is saying that
it is just our opinion as opposed to e.g. the opinion of the gods, or
an opinion [that corresponds with the eternal order of the uni-
verse], then he is under a misapprehension about what opinion
could ever be.95
If we accept the deflationist view of truth in the first ladder, we
recognize the equivalence of the sentences "Slavery is wrong" and
"'Slavery is wrong' is true." The sentences are equivalent because we
would use the exact same methods ofjustification to establish either-
adducing evidence about the suffering that slavery causes to humans,
and urging that others pay attention to our reasons. Similarly, we
would back up the opinion "slavery is wrong" by the very same evidence
94. SCANLON, supra note 18, at 197 ("Typically, our intuitive judgments about the
wrongness of actions are not simplyjudgments that an act is wrong but that it is wrong for
some reason, or in virtue of some general characteristic."). Calling something an opinion
invites the rejoinder, "de gustibus non est disputandum." It is true that some matters come
down to an arbitrary judgment which can be referred to in everyday use as taste, prefer-
ence, or opinion. There is really not anything that can be used to adjudicate between a
preference for Cajun food and a preference for Italian; it is just something that you like or
dislike, and that is all there is to it. Most opinions, however, at least on any subject that
matters, are founded in something, notjust the person's subjectivity. For example, suppose I
say, "In my opinion Cosifan tutti is a great opera." That is an opinion, to be sure, but it is
not founded on pure preference-I have a set of aesthetic criteria in mind for what makes
a great work of art. Of course, people can disagree-Beethoven loathed Cosi--but again,
that disagreement is based on something, it is not just the mutual assertion of subjective
preferences. Beethoven believed that great art cannot be cynical, so he concluded that Cosi
cannot be great art. The disagreement is really over the nature of great art, whether it has
to be uplifting or can be cynical. And that is something worth arguing about. See also PUT-
NAM, RHF, supra note 4, at 179, 182-83. No one thinks these arguments come down to
pure assertions of opinion, even though there are disagreements; there are some argu-
ments that are ruled out, some have more plausibility than others, and communities (such
as informed listeners and music critics) have standards and criteria for assessing the quality
of someone's contribution to the debate. At some point pure preference can enter the
picture. One might prefer Figaro to Cosi, or prefer Verdi to Mozart. But the existence of
some questions of opinion in a domain such as aesthetics does not mean that fruitful dis-
cussions are impossible because all questions in the domain come down to subjective
preferences.
95. BIAcKmuRN, RP, supra note 3, at 305; see also HAMPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 64.
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and arguments we would use to defend the statement "slavery is
wrong."
The truth conditions of the sentence (call it an opinion if you
like), "slavery is wrong," are constructed with reference to concepts we
share with others. I am not saying we necessarily share all our values
with others, or even a great many of them. At least we do, however,
share evaluative concepts like pleasure, suffering, fairness, dignity, vio-
lence, and peace, although we naturally disagree about the extension of
these concepts and the way they might be harmonized in any situation
of conflict among them. This point is related to the argument from
Davidson, noted above, that any disagreement can be understood only
against a background of agreement. We act for reasons, and we can
make those reasons known to others. If we disagree with someone, it is
because we disagree with their reasons, but we do understand them.96
If we did not share concepts with persons with whom we disagreed,
they would be unintelligible to us, not opponents in a debate. If some-
one said, "slavery is not wrong, because snow is white," we would think
he was crazy, or playing elaborate metaphorical games. Simply to par-
ticipate in the practice called "ethics" means to be committed to a
process of giving certain kinds of reasons in justification for judg-
ments about what one ought to do. If people who disagree are at all
motivated to move beyond the impasse, and they think language is the
appropriate medium for doing so (as opposed to, say, duels), then
there are logical constraints that apply to any such language that func-
tions as a medium for resolving ethical disputes.97
Only certain things count as reasons in ethics, and it is clear what
those reasons are from talking about ethics. Again, ordinary discursive
practices illuminate the nature of the subject matter. In the classroom,
it should not be difficult to find something that a student regards as
wrong-cheating on one's spouse, crossing picket lines, torturing con-
fessions out of suspects, sexually abusing children, forcing women to
cover themselves from head to toe when leaving their homes, "partial
birth" abortions (or prosecuting women for having abortions), main-
taining separate water fountains for whites and blacks, using racial epi-
thets, slipping date rape drugs to women, performing medical
experiments on ignorant participants, executing criminals by methods
such as the electric chair and the gas chamber, and so on. For a mo-
96. See, e.g., Gilbert Harman, Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on
Hilay Putnam's Reason, Truth and History, 79J. PHIL. 568, 570-71 (1982).
97. See BLcKuR, RP, supra note 3, at 229; NozIcK, INVARIANCES, supra note 10, at
55-58.
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ment, put aside disagreements about the extension of ethical concepts,
or what we might call first order normative judgments-for example
whether an unborn fetus counts as a human life. Instead, we can give
examples of ethical reasons that can be offered in support of or in
opposition to particular evaluations. The point of these examples is
that certain concepts, categories, and patterns of argument recur in
ethical discourse. The following list of ethical concepts includes exam-
ples, in parentheses, of the first order judgments they might
underwrite:
" Ethical reasons must be generalizable to relevantly similar
cases.98 (If abortion is wrong because no one may intentionally
take a human life under any circumstances, then the death pen-
alty is also wrong.)
" One must act consistently on ethical principles, applying them to
oneself with the same force as they are urged on another. (If one
moral justification for the American entry into the Second World
War was that Hitler's Germany was a racist regime, then the
United States should not permit racial segregation in the military
or at home.)
" Some facts about the natural world ("nonmoral facts"), such as
the capacity of humans to suffer, are relevant to the evaluation of
actions.9 9 (It is wrong to cause suffering without a good reason,
and the alleviation of suffering is a prima facie good.)
* Relatedly, there are certain things that all would agree are
human goods, and things that all would agree are human
bads. 10 0 (All things being equal, a society in which there is less
misery is preferable to one in which there is more misery.)
" Because ethics is a substitute for resolving disputes by force, ethi-
cal reasoning should strive for the resolution of disputes in a way
that avoids coercion, domination, and threats, using instead "a
regular and reasonable procedure of weighing claims and
counter-claims." 0 1 (You shouldn't threaten visiting lecturers
with pokers to win arguments. 10 2 )
" Purely self-regarding reasons are insufficient to justify an action
ethically; that is, ethics is something that matters from the stand-
98. See Mackie, supra note 7, at 83-90.
99. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 47, at 39-42 (indicating that capacities provide the inter-
personal basis for making ethical arguments).
100. See Simon Blackburn, Being Good: A Short Introduction to Ethics 86-97 (2000)
[hereinafter BLAcKBuRN, BG]; LARMoRE, supra note 43, at 139-41. Some philosophers take
the basic human good as being relatively empty of substantive content-for example, both
Nozick and Gauthier define the purpose of ethics as securing mutually beneficial coopera-
tion. See NozicK, INVARIANCEs, supra note 10, at 240; DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS By AGREE-
MENT (1986).
101. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 63, 75.
102. See DAVID EDMONDS &JOHN EIDINOW, WrTGENSTEIN'S POKER: THE STORY OF A TEN-
MINUTE ARGUMENT BETWEEN Two GREAT PHILOSOPHERS (2001).
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point of people other than ourselves.' 03 (If I won $10 million in
the lottery and dissipated it all on drugs, lavish parties, and ex-
pensive cars, "I had a lot of fun" would not be an answer to the
argument that I should have given some of the money to char-
ity.) Incidentally, the strong Kantian version of this principle is
that only actions done out of respect for the moral law count as
"ethical."
* Family and kinship ties, political institutions, and intermediate
associations such as labor unions generate obligations. (You
should remain faithful to people in certain kinds of relationships
and not betray their expectations.)
* At the same time, ethical reasons ought to be impartial to some
degree, among affected persons, including the agent. 10 4 (It is
wrong to give too much preference to one's own family, social
group, or nation. It is unfair for the United States to emit a dis-
proportionate share of greenhouse gases, just because cutting
back on emissions would hurt the United States economy.)
* Just as obligations can arise from associations, permissions and
excuses can arise from volitional acts such as consent. 10 5 (The
absence of consent can make an otherwise permissible act like
sexual intercourse into the morally wrong act of rape, and medi-
cal experimentation without consent is wrong.)
" Particular aspects of human difference are ruled out as reasons
for action. In other words, one function of ethics is to counteract
the natural tendency of human beings to sympathize only with
people who are like them in some way. 10 6 (Racial segregation is
wrong, while sex-segregated restrooms are not.)
" Ethics is something that is concerned primarily with our relation-
ships with others. The subject matter of ethics can be distin-
guished from arbitrary tastes and preferences by the legitimacy
of the concern which others express toward our actions, prefer-
ences, and concerns. 10 7 (If someone suggested that he enjoyed
torturing children we would not regard this as merely a prefer-
ence and therefore determine not to interfere with him.)
Although this is meant to be a rough and merely suggestive
sketch (others may come up with quite different lists, some of which
would contain only one entry), I contend that some categories like
these are logically constitutive of ethical reasoning. If someone said
that sexually abusing children was not wrong during a full moon, we
103. See David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency 143-47 (1995); MACKIE,
supra note 7, at 190; BERNARD GERT, MORALITY: A NEW JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL RULES
143-47 (1988).
104. GERT, supra note 103, at 77-95 (1988).
105. See APPLBAUM, supra note 55, at 166-67.
106. See Mackie, supra note 7, at 108; GERT, supra note 103, at 107-08. This principle
underlies Rawls's "veil of ignorance" device, which is intended to screen parties in the
original position off from particularities such as their race, sex, and social class. See RAwLS,
supra note 8, at 136-42.
107. See BLACKBURN, RP, supra note 3, at 8-11.
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would question his sanity.10 8 More seriously, we would deny that the
fact that something is good for me or my tribe or my nation is, by
itself, an ethical reason that could be given in a debate over, say,
whether the United States should join a worldwide effort to reduce
global warming. These procedural ground rules for what counts as a
valid move in an ethical argument are not invented anew every time
two people try to resolve a disagreement; rather, they are the stan-
dards that make this kind of argument possible. 10 9
If this line of argument is correct, then the nature of ethical justi-
fication would be the locus of objectivity in ethics, not any particular
evaluative judgment we may reach or the correspondence between
ethical judgments and some kind of entities that inhere in the fabric
of the universe. 110 Criteria of acceptability of ethical reasons give us
tools for evaluating ethical judgments as better or worse, although not
necessarily absolutely right or wrong. 1 ' It may be true that we cannot
compel someone to accept a particular ethical judgment, on pain of
being regarded as irrational. 1" 2 But this is a false ideal. Ethics should
not be held to an impossible standard, so that we become suspicious
of all ethical reasoning if it is unable to deliver mandatory judgments.
This is, however, precisely the criterion of success for ethical reason-
ing that many philosophers have established. As Simon Blackburn
points out, the concept of rationality is notoriously plastic in ethics,
108. Although some self-styled "postmodern" or "pragmatic" critics of ethics think they
are casting doubt on the whole enterprise of making normative judgments, they are saying
something quite banal. Stanley Fish, for example, thinks it is fatal to the practice of reason-
giving in ethics that certain kinds of reasons must be excluded from the discussion ab initio.
STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 69-72, 160-61, 169-70 (1999). But no process
of reasoning can even get started without a set of working assumptions about what counts
as a reason within that domain. Fish regards this as a process of coercion or imposition, but
these are just metaphors. No complex process of reasoning can be rested only on self-
validating axioms of pure reason that everyone must accept. Still, Fish believes he is mor-
ally permitted to write a book in which he tries to persuade his readers of something,
which requires principles for evaluating arguments that are shared between Fish and
reader. Either Fish's metaphor of reasoning as violence proves too much or he is appealing
to some kind of exception to the moral proscription on coercion, which remains
unarticulated.
109. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 74-75. This argument resembles Lon Fuller's
"inner morality of law," which seeks to ground the authority of law not in the substantive
nature of its prescriptions, but in the formal characteristics of valid laws. See LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969).
110. See WONG, supra note 3, at 1-9 (suggesting different ways of defining objectivity in
ethics); Thomas Nagel, Subjective and Objective, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 196, 206-07 (1979)
(subjective and objective are poles of a continuum, not a binary opposition).
111. See PUTNAM, RHF, supra note 4, at 182-83; BLACKBURN, BG, supra note 100, at 28.
112. See BLACKBURN, RP, supra note 3, at 261.
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because of the obsession with constructing normative judgments that
are "necessary," "non-contingent," and valid from the "transcendental
standpoint of reason."1 13 Instead, he says, we should be willing to rest
content with a notion of moral reasoning that aims at evaluating per-
sonal moral beliefs and political institutions, in terms of the excel-
lence of the lives they promote, the values that these lives embody,
and the disasters from which they protect us. 114 Political liberalism,
for example, is worthy of our admiration because it helps keep in
check such evils as religious warfare, ethnic hatreds, and abuses of
authority by dominant groups. That is enough basis for us to praise
and desire liberalism as a governing ideology as opposed to, say, Mao-
ism. These judgments may be provisional, not final, 1 5 and our ethical
judgments may in principle remain open. However, this is not neces-
sarily a bad thing-it helps us avoid the vices of dogmatism, pride, and
narrow-mindedness that might accompany a tendency to think of
moral judgments as delivering some kind of absolute, necessary, good-
for-all-places-and-all-times kind of truth.
Note that one can take this kind of argument a step farther, and
attempt to specify particular substantive concerns that belong to the
domain of ethics. I am content to locate the objectivity of ethical judg-
ments in agreement on procedural standards, such as those listed
above, but a common move in response to relativist or skeptical argu-
ments in philosophy is to observe the wide range of intercultural
agreement on certain ethical principles, stated at a high level of
abstraction.
Every society that is recognizably human will need some institution
of property (some distinction between "mine" and "yours"), some
norm governing truth-telling, some conception of promise giving,
some standards restraining violence and killing. It will need some
device for restraining sexual expression, some sense of what is ap-
propriate by way of treating strangers, or minorities, or children, or
the aged, or the handicapped. It will need some sense of how to
distribute resources, and how to treat those who have not. In other
words, across the whole spectrum of life, it will need some sense of
what is expected and what is out of line. 116
A list such as this one-describing universal human goods,
human capabilities, or principles of ethics-can be found in the work
113. Id. at 271.
114. See id. at 275.
115. See PUTNAM, RHF, supra note 4, at 183.
116. BLAcKBURN, BG, supra note 100, at 23.
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of such diverse philosophers as the Christian apologist C.S. Lewis, 117
the natural law theorist John Finnis,118 and the liberal feminist politi-
cal philosopher Martha Nussbaum. 119 Others, such as the sociologist
Alan Wolfe, argue that there are broad areas of agreement, at least in
American society, regarding a great many supposedly disputed ethical
issues. 120
Whether hypothesizing agreement at higher or lower levels of ab-
straction, this strategy is the kind of argument suggested by Jonathan
Glover's richly detailed and horrifying "moral history" of the last hun-
dred years. 121 Glover suggests shifting the emphasis in ethics from the-
oretical to practical concerns, by which I understand him to be
suggesting an empirical, bottom up approach to moral questions.
Looking for an external validation of morality is less effective than
building breakwaters. Morality could be abandoned, or it can be
re-created. It may survive in a more defensible form when seen to
be a human creation. We can shape it consciously to serve people's
needs and interests, and to reflect the things we most care
about.122
Glover and Simon Blackburn (two philosophers who otherwise have
much to disagree about) share the ambition to ground ethics in "peo-
ple's needs and interests." This approach naturally invites the rejoin-
der: "What if my interests are those of the Nazi party? What if I care
only about the welfare of Hutus, not Tutsis?" One response is to seek
to ground the objectivity of ethics (via the standards for rational ac-
ceptability of ethical judgments) in facts about human nature that are
commonly shared by all people. For example, Hilary Putnam, citing
Durkheim, argues that we have a deeply rooted and central need for
social solidarity, which is violated by practices such as ethnic cleansing
and genocide.' 23 A similar response is to argue that no ethicaljustifica-
tion can be offered for the Nazi program or the Hutu-sponsored ge-
117. See generally C.S. LEwis, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1947) (listing highly abstract uni-
versal moral norms, such as treating the dead with respect and refraining from wanton
killing).
118. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90 (1980).
119. See MARTHA C. NussBAuM, SEX AND SOCIALJusTICE 41-42 (1999) (listing universal
human functional capabilities, such as bodily health and integrity, emotions, play, and ef-
fective participation in one's political environment).
120. See ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFrER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS REALLY
THINK ABOUT GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALITY,
WoRK, THE RIGHT, THE LEVr, AND EACH OTHER (1998).
121. SeeJONATHAN GLOVER, HuMANrITY. A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1999).
122. Id. at 41.
123. See Putnam, RHF, supra note 4, at 189.
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nocide, because the kind of life these visions imagine are devoid of
authentic human goods and full of multifarious evils, cannot be gen-
eralized to situations in which the shoe would be on the other foot
(the Nazis would not approve of a eugenic program run by Slavs and
Jews and the Hutus certainly would not want to see ethnic cleansing
applied to them), and trade on differences between humans which
are impermissible as a basis for allocating benefits and punishments.
I am aware that all of these reasons are contestable, and someone
could be required to explain why, for example, it is illegitimate to
discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. In this essay I am concerned
only with sketching what an ethical justification would look like but if
necessary, anyone could take the argument deeper, and give further
ethical reasons that racial discrimination is evil. At the very least, a
skeptic or relativist is required to do more than just say, "Well, the
Nazis and the Hutus thought race discrimination wasn't a bad thing."
Rather, the opponent of our argument must give reasons why race
discrimination is not a bad thing for anyone, not just for Nazis or
Hutus. The opponent must be able to point to some form of genuine
human flourishing, or excellence, or form of life that was advanced by
the Nazis or the Hutus.12 4 A society in which people of one race are
systematically deprived of rights, or their lives, simply does not pro-
mote any kind of human good. 2 5
More to the point, the opponent cannot demand a full blown
metaethical account of the nature of morality to buttress the state-
ment that genocide is evil. In most discussions of ethics, the reason
giving process occurs at the first order, not the second. A brilliant
illustration of this slippage is provided by Simon Blackburn's critique
of Mackie's subjectivism. 126 Mackie defended an error thesis: Al-
though people think they are talking about objective right and wrong
124. See Gray, supra note 42, at 53.
125. Another response here is to point to the foundation of the argument in human
goods and exclaim, "Aha! If humans were different, if we had nine lives like cats, then it
might not be true that taking a human life is one of the grossest evils." The reply to this
argument is simply to ask why we would require a definition of the concept of ethics that is
so general that it can answer questions about what would be right and wrong if we were
radically different. In another brilliant illustration by Robert Nozick (he was wonderful
with examples), if someone demands to know what is a good wine, we could produce a
wine encyclopedia, listing good vintages and regions, and we could explain why a particu-
lar wine tastes good. An explanation of what would be a good wine if the Earth's atmos-
phere were different, or if the chemistry of grapes was not as it is, or if our taste receptors
were not attuned to the same flavors, would be unilluminating, because those counterfac-
tuals are not true. See NOZiCK, INVARIANCES, supra note 10, at 69-70.
126. See Simon Blackburn, Errors and the Phenomenology of Value, in MORALITy AND OBJEC.
Triwy 1 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985).
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when they talk about ethics, they really are not; they are systematically
in error about the nature of morality. Blackburn then asks why Mackie
did not attempt to purge his vocabulary of all moral terms that con-
tained this spurious assurance of objectivity. Why not adopt instead a
"shmoral" vocabulary? But in the second half of his book, Mackie did
not talk in shmoral terms; rather, he simply argued for a number of
moral propositions, as if he had never advanced his error thesis. (In
other words, he argued for first order claims about what one ought to
do, and implied that his position was right and opposing arguments
were wrong.) If Mackie, a vigorous critic of morality's claim to objec-
tivity if ever there was one, nevertheless is content to use a purportedly
objective moral vocabulary, we may be justified in wondering what the
point is of raising doubts about second order ethical claims.
B. Doubts About Deflated Truth
There will be many who resist dispensing with the term "truth" in
ethics, but the challenge for those who would retain the concept of
truth is to explain what it is for an ethical judgment to be true. Defla-
tionists about truth merely maintain that the concept is redundant,
not that ethical judgments are purely subjective or relative to the con-
ventions of cultural or social groups. If truth means instead something
like correspondence with "ethical facts" that are out there somewhere
in the natural world, what are those facts and how do we have any
knowledge of them? People who argue that an ethical theory must
correspond somehow with the facts of the external world are known as
realists) 27 Realists think their theories not only provide a satisfying
account of the way in which ethical judgments are justified, but that
theirs is the only way to head off the relativist challenge. Although the
issue is by no means settled, I think the project of giving a realist ac-
count of objectivity in ethics faces insurmountable obstacles. John
Mackie is right that even if there are something like "objective values"
out there to be observed through some mysterious faculty of intuition,
it is hard to see how something that is part of the furniture of the
universe can, by itself, underwrite prescriptions or practical conclu-
sions, without reference to attitudes and desires of human actors. 128
And I tend to agree with Jeremy Waldron, that even if there were in
principle some such thing as objective truth about ethics, it would not
127. This terminology is inverted in law. "Legal realists" believe that the law is not
"really" there, but is (on some versions) simply a prediction about what officials will do in
given cases.
128. See Mackie, supra note 7, at 30-42.
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be of much use to humans unless we could specify some procedures
for using this objective truth to resolve ethical disagreements. 129
These are familiar anti-realist arguments for either dispensing with
"truth-talk" in ethics altogether, or understanding the concept of
truth in a more modest fashion.
The problem is that similar arguments can be raised against mod-
est, or deflationist accounts of objectivity in ethics. Waldron doubts
the existence of even the kind of procedural agreement I suggested
above. In science, "a single (albeit loosely defined) conception of
method for settling disagreements is shared by a significant group of
people who regard themselves as engaged in serious disagreement
with one another .... Among moralists, there is nothing remotely compara-
ble.' 130 As between a utilitarian and a Kantian, there is no procedure
they can use to settle their disagreements. But I am not so sure the
world can be divided up into neat categories like "Aristotelians, Nietz-
scheans, Marxists, traditional conservatives like Burke, liberals like
Rawls, feminists like Gilligan,"13 and so on. Rather, ordinary moral
reasoning partakes of these different approaches, to varying degrees.
"[W]e have an allegiance to several different moral principles that
urge independent claims upon us (we cannot plausibly see the one as
a means for promoting the other) and so can draw us in irreconcila-
ble ways.' 132 Ethically conscientious people can deliberate among
these plural values and perhaps choose to rank them differently, de-
pending on some foundational assumptions they make about the ex-
cellence for humans.
As Isaiah Berlin pointed out again and again, there is no single
form of the good life which encompasses all of the human virtues. An
artist, in order to create a masterpiece, may lead a life which plunges
his family into misery and squalor to which he is indifferent. We may
condemn him and declare that the masterpiece should be sacrificed
to human needs, or we may take his side-but both attitudes embody
values which for some men or women are ultimate, and which are
intelligible to us all if we have any sympathy or imagination or under-
standing of human beings. 133
129. SeeJEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 177-78 (1999).
130. Id. at 178.
131. Id.
132. LAR_,oRE, supra note 43, at 138.
133. See Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HuMANrTv 1,
12 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990).
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This does not mean that anything goes, or that the Nazi sympa-
thizer can appeal to Berlinian pluralism, for pluralism may neverthe-
less embody an account of objective goods. 13 4 A great work of art and
a harmonious family life are both moral ideals. Violently racist nation-
alism is not an appealing vision of the good for humans. But a Ber-
linian pluralist can respond to someone like Waldron, who believes
there is no way to resolve disputes about morality, that we can at least
inquire into questions such as the relative weightings of values in par-
ticular cases, whether a given ideal is indeed a contribution to a well-
lived human life, and so on. There will always be interminable dis-
putes-that is simply the consequence of pluralism-but a great many
disputes will be capable of resolution, even though the world seems to
invite moral analysis using incompatible theories like utilitarianism,
dialectical materialism, and the ethics of care.
Another argument that is sometimes raised against even modest
claims of objectivity in ethics points out the manifold errors that have
been made by people who thought they were pronouncing moral
truth. What we once took as a timeless truth is now regarded as the
height of stupidity-the earth is flat, the sun revolves around the
earth, women are inferior, slavery is a positive good for Africans, it is
the Manifest Destiny for White European settlers to displace the native
population of the Americas, and so on. Some of these claims are em-
pirical ones which can be disproved by the methods of natural sci-
ence, while others are normative. In the case of normative
propositions, it is more difficult to establish shared criteria for truth
or falsity; nevertheless, there is at least a widespread consensus on the
falsity of numerous ethical positions that were once commonly held.
Perhaps my college roommate (now a philosophy professor) is right,
that subsequent generations will regard killing animals for food as a
grave moral evil, and wonder how their ancestors could possibly have
countenanced the practice for so long.135 In addition, as John Stuart
Mill wisely pointed out, we all concede that we may be fallible, but we
tend not to think that truths in which we believe strongly are the
things about which we are mistaken.' 3 6 People who acknowledge their
own individual fallibility, but check their own opinions against those
134. See GRAv, supra note 42, at 53.
135. Or, as Stuart Hampshire imagines, perhaps our grandchildren will ask, "How can
they have failed to see the injustice of allowing billionaires to multiply while the very same
economy allowed abject poverty to persist uncorrected next door to preposterous luxury."
HAMPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 59.
136. SeeJ.S. Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 21 (Stefan Collini
ed., 1989).
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of others in their world, often forget that "their world" often consists
of only the part of the world with which they come into contact-their
party, sect, church, tribe, social class, race, nation, and so on. 137
It is essential, however, not to unthinkingly assume a binary oppo-
sition between (1) a conception of ethical judgments as being necessa-
rily valid at all times and in all places for all people, and (2) a
relativistic conception, in which ethical judgments are valid only with
respect to temporal and cultural particularities, or skepticism about
the validity of all moral claims. We should recognize the potential falli-
bility of our ethical judgments, and be alert for resources that may
help us revise our practices for the better. One of the most important
contributions of multicultural education is to provide some leverage
for criticizing existing ethical norms by showing how similar problems
are handled by other cultures. In addition, ethical evaluation gets
complicated when the judgments are made diachronically, not syn-
chronically. In other words, although an ethical judgment made at
some time t1 may have been wrong, as we now know from the stand-
point of time t2, we nevertheless might introduce mitigating circum-
stances into our evaluation of the agent at time t', even though we
maintain the evaluation that the moral judgment at t' was wrong.
There are degrees of culpability with respect to moral wrongdo-
ing. Take the example of slavery: Slaveholding was morally wrong in
antebellum Virginia, in classical Athens, in Muslim nations prior to
the expansion of the Atlantic slave trade, and in Biblical times-just as
wrong as it is today. Does that mean we should criticize George Wash-
ington as strongly as we would condemn someone today who advo-
cated a return to slavery? I think the answer is no, even though the
wrongfulness of slavery is identical in both contexts. The moral evalua-
tion of the character of George Washington (as opposed to the evalua-
tion of the morality of holding slaves) requires an assessment of the
prevailing social mores. Opposing slavery, or refusing to hold slaves as
a member of the propertied classes in an agrarian economy, may have
been above and beyond the call of moral duty ("supererogatory" in
the jargon of modern moral philosophy) in Revolutionary America,
although it is undoubtedly a moral requirement today. Although
some leading figures in early American history expressed some reser-
vations about slavery,13 8 in general no politician ever seriously pro-
137. See id.
138. Consider Jefferson's statement that "I tremble for my country when I reflect that
God is just." THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 163 (William Peden ed.,
1955). Jefferson may not have been a thoroughgoing opponent of slavery, as he is some-
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posed its abolition. Indeed, it would have been little short of heroism
for anyone to oppose slavery in a climate in which it was regarded as
natural, religiously warranted, and beneficial for the enslaved. Even by
the middle of the nineteenth century, opponents of slavery had to
speak with exquisite care-consider, for example, that Lincoln felt
compelled in his debates with Douglas to disavow any claims to the
social and political equality of African Americans, even though he was
deeply disturbed by slavery.
Jeffrey Stout is correct when he writes that "people who lived
thousands of years ago don't deserve epistemic blame for believing
that the world is flat."139 But he also believes that the earth is not flat.
Squaring these two propositions with each other requires an account
of blameworthiness (epistemic in the case of empirical propositions
such as the flatness of the earth, moral in the case of propositions
about the wrongness of slavery) that is independent to some extent of
the underlying truth of the matter. Whether someone should be
blamed for holding a belief is relative to one's time and circum-
stances-the available evidence, prevailing criteria of verification, the
culture's store of experience, social pressures to believe or conform to
the received wisdom, the degree a belief has been subjected to critical
scrutiny, and so on. People in a given time tend to believe that certain
practices and beliefs are "unalterable parts of the natural or divine
order of things. 1 40 In light of the prevalence of social myths, we
might expect reasonable people to believe something that, with time
and distance from the received wisdom of a time, seems to us to be
obviously false. This is what I mean by the relativity of blameworthi-
ness. What is emphatically not relative, however, is the truth of the
belief. The earth did not become round with the advent of more so-
phisticated measuring instruments and methods of mathematics; simi-
larly, slavery did not become wrong when people discovered it was
wrong. Nevertheless, we may permit an argument in mitigation on be-
half of a historical figure whose best moral judgment at the time
turned out, in hindsight, to be fallacious.1 4 1
times portrayed by his hagiographers, but the quote does show that he entertained some
doubts about the morality of the institution. See generally JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX:
THE CHARACrER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 171-80 (1996).
139. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR Dis-
CONTENTS 29 (1988).
140. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 10, at 57.
141. But you can't have it both ways. Consider the character of Atticus Finch in Harper
Lee's novel, To Kill a Mockingbird. Finch is often held out as a paragon of virtue as a lawyer.
As Monroe Freedman, a legal ethicist who has resisted the prevailing wisdom, points out,
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Conclusion
The kind of objectivity I have been concerned to establish may
not sound like much, and it may concede too much to the relativist
cause. Despite my fulminations against the varieties of naive relativism
and skepticism that students assert in ethics classes, I do think in eth-
ics it can be difficult to navigate between the concerns of relativism,
on the one hand, and an unrealistically stringent demand for objectiv-
ity, on the other. As Alasdair MacIntyre notes, the amount of energy
that philosophers have devoted to "refuting" relativism suggests that
there is some important, not to be ignored truth in the position they
are attacking; after all, "[g]enuinely refutable positions only need to
be refuted once."1 42 The reason that we cannot refute relativism once
and for all is not only that it is a seductive position, for the reasons
explored in the first section, but also because objectivity in ethics is
not the same as objectivity in other domains, such as natural science.
Ethics and epistemology are both public processes of reason giving,
but empirical knowledge about the natural world seems so much
more certain and objective, because its verification procedures are
widely agreed upon, and tend to result in substantial agreement in
most cases. In the case of ethics, we have to resort to procedures of
justification and verification that do not produce determinate answers
in all cases. For this reason, ethical knowledge seems to be of a differ-
ent order of certainty altogether, at least if we do not rely on tradi-
tional sources of authority like divine revelation, "moral facts," or a
mysterious faculty of intuition.143 The only thing we can rely upon for
Finch has some fairly unattractive views about the social equality of African Americans. If
one is supposed to avoid the vice of "presentism" and refrain from judging Finch nega-
tively because of his racism, which was common to many educated whites in Alabama in the
1930s, then it seems inconsistent to praise Finch using contemporary moral standards. Is
that positive judgment not also an example of "presentism?" See Monroe H. Freedman,
Atticus Finch-Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REv. 473 (1994). See generally HARPER LEE, To
KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
142. Alasdair Maclntyre, Relativism, Power, and Philosophy, in RELATIVISM: INTERPRETA-
TION AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 3, at 182.
143. There is not room here to consider all of these now-disfavored sources of objectiv-
ity in ethics, although they probably do not have many adherents among academic
ethicists. Many of our students may assert religious grounds for their belief in a proposition
of ethics, however, and ethics teachers should be prepared to deal with this. The relation-
ship between religion and ethics is of course an ancient philosophical problem, receiving
well known treatment in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro. Socrates asked his interlocutor
whether something that is holy is "holy because the gods approve of it, or do they approve
it because it is holy?" PLATO, Euthyphro l0a (Lane Cooper trans.), in THE COLLECTED DIA-
LOGUES 169, 178 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961). Euthyphro eventually
agrees with Socrates that the gods love that which is holy. In other words, the gods are not
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a grounding is the nature of ethical language and the process of rea-
soning that is constitutive of ethical argument.
The alternative is a kind of dogmatism that has proven to be dis-
astrous in human affairs. As Rawls has argued, the religious warfare of
the sixteenth century marked the beginning of the realization that
people have to figure out a way to get along in peace, despite their
profound religious and cultural differences. 144 One might argue that
all ethical thought since the Reformation has been less than perfectly
objective, or not objective at all, because it assumes that people can
reasonably differ over ultimate issues, such as the true path to salva-
tion. And it may be true, as MacIntyre has suggested, that too much
pluralism and reasonable disagreement can produce a kind of cul-
tural anomie, in which no one really believes in anything, and reason-
able ethical discourse is paralyzed. 145 But I doubt very much whether
anyone would be willing to say that there is nothing in modem life to
stand behind, endorse, and defend with all one's might. Even in a
culture in which not all moral issues can be resolved definitively
through reasoning, we still try to resolve disputes through reasoning
of a particular kind, making arguments with recognizable patterns,
and appealing to values that are within the domain of ethics. Ethical
reasoning can certainly rule out a great many actions and ways of life
(slavery, child labor, apartheid, torture) as being immoral. In addi-
tion, through reasoning we can get clear on points of disagreement,
and at least narrow the scope of our disputes. Once a dispute comes
down to one intractable disagreement, such as whether life begins at
conception, we may simply have to accept continued, and reasonable
arbitrary-they love things with good reason, and that reason is the holiness of what they
love. This kind of argument has taken on heightened significance in view of the religious
justification claimed by the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. With
the appropriate training, one can engage in textual criticism of the Koran and challenge
Bin Laden's interpretation of it. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, This is a Religious War, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. Oct. 7, 2001, at 44 (reviewing arguments within the Islamic tradition for and against
violence). Suppose the text is ambiguous, as is true of the text of most holy books-what
then? In that case, one's argument against Bin Laden must include the ethical claim that
the Koran cannot possibly be understood correctly as permitting the slaughter of
thousands of innocent people, because no true religion could countenance what took
place on September 11 th. The only way to understand internal arguments within a relig-
ious tradition is to accept Socrates' view in the Euthyphro, that religious reasons can be
criticized with reference to non-religious ethical reasons. The extent to which religious
ethics is distinctive from secular ethics, and divine revelation provides a different kind of
reason to act, is a subject about which I know less than I should. But I am fairly confident
that asserting a religious basis for one's action does not preempt ethical criticism of those
reasons.
144. SeeJOHN RAwts, POLITICAL LIBERALISM XXV-Xxviii (1993).
145. See A[ASDAIR MACINTYRE. AFTER VIRTUE 62-78 (2d ed. 1984).
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disagreement as the price we pay for a stable and harmonious society.
As Rawls writes: "To see reasonable pluralism as a disaster is to see the
exercise of reason under the conditions of freedom itself as a
disaster." 146
Is rough agreement on the kinds of procedures that are constitu-
tive of ethics a sufficient basis for a claim to truth or objectivity in
ethics? I have tried to show that the question may be a distraction.
Labels like "true" or "objective," whether in ethics or in epistemology,
are nothing more than signs of our endorsement of the result of a
specified procedure for verifying and justifying claims. These proce-
dures are contingent to some extent-they depend, at least, on our
capacity to experience pleasure and suffer pain; our desire to live to-
gether in harmony; the impact of scarcity of resources on our dealings
with one another; our tendency to feel emotional ties of affection to-
ward other human beings and feelings of dislike for others; our capa-
bilities and potential; our physical limitations; and similar facts about
the natural world and our natures. And it is certainly true that differ-
ent cultures or societies will choose ways of life that differ in impor-
tant respects from others. Procedures of ethical reasoning are not
radically contingent, however. Not just any old argument will do, and
not every culturally bound way of life will be one that is ethically ac-
ceptable. In other words, we may believe in a kind of objective plural-
ism, rather than simply accepting the diversity of beliefs as the end of
the matter. This is the difference between the relativism against which
I have been concerned to argue and a procedural ethics which takes
pluralism as fundamental but which nevertheless leads to objective
conclusions in some cases. Obviously this kind of ethics does not sup-
ply all the answers, but it at least gets the discussion started. For teach-
ers of practical ethics, that is all that is needed.
146. RAwLs, supra note 144, at xxvi-xxvii.
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